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I. INTRODUCTION

This essay examines the conception of self-evidence, which is the logical
foundation of John Finnis’ influential reconstruction of natural law
jurisprudence. His most widely known book, Natural Law and Natural
Rights,1 is authoritative for many contemporary legal philosophers and
jurists as the most coherent statement of contemporary natural law theory.2
But, despite its widespread influence, many questions exist regarding the
details of Finnis’ natural law theory. In developing his theory, Finnis is
concerned to avoid the critique of the legal positivists, who viewed natural
law theories as committing the logical error of deriving normative claims
from factual claims. David Hume was the first to identify this error, and G.
E. Moore later described it as the “naturalistic fallacy.”3 Finnis believes this
is a critical obstacle for natural law theories to overcome. To avoid
committing this error, he seeks to build a version of the natural law that
asserts the validity of its normative claims on the basis of the structure of
practical reason itself, and thus overcomes the naturalistic fallacy by looking
only to normative claims without reducing them to factual assertions. In his
reconstruction of the natural law tradition, Finnis proceeds from certain pre1. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
2. Robert P. George writes:
Future intellectual historians will no doubt present the book, together with Professor Finnis’ other
philosophical writings, as part of the broad revival in more or less Aristotelian approaches to
moral and political thinking that gained prominence beginning in the late 1970s. And they will
be right.
REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS (John Keown & Robert P.
George, eds., 2013) [hereinafter REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW].
3. G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA § 25 (1988).
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moral principles4 that are self-evident to practical reason as desirable goals
for action. These normative claims are not derived from any factual claims,
but are known immediately to be valid in themselves, since their validity is
self-evident.5 Finnis argues that since they are self-evidently valid, they
cannot be derived from more basic claims of practical reason or from any
factual or theoretical claims.6 Therefore, he calls these principles selfevident truths of practical reason, and he refers to them as the basic forms
of pre-moral goods. Finnis identifies seven such principles of practical
reason.7 The self-evidence of these Basic Goods is the foundational
epistemic principle of the Finnis reconstruction of natural law.
Despite the critical role that the concept of self-evidence plays in his
thought, Finnis acknowledges it provokes suspicion. “But is there not
something fishy about appeal to self-evidence?” he writes.8 While he
suggests that a full explication of the argument for self-evidence exceeds the
scope of his work, he “observe[s] in passing” that modern geometry (citing,
notably David Hilbert)9 makes use of “self-evidence” to identify
fundamental concepts and (notably) some criteria for completeness.10 He
also implies that the natural sciences rest on elementary formal logic, which
he takes to be founded on self-evident principles.11 Self-evidence, he
argues, is the basic sound principle of reason in any empirical discipline.12
Despite the success of Finnis’ program, his conception of self-evidence
remains to be rigorously explored and defended. The goal of this essay is
to look closely at Finnis’ foundational claims against the rigorous standards
of mathematics and logic. It is argued here that by those standards, selfevidence cannot play the role as a foundation for practical reason that Finnis
seeks for it.

4. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 59.
5. See id. at 66–69 (discussing the self-evident value of knowledge as a good to be pursued).
6. See id. at 66 (stating the value of pre-moral principles cannot be inferred from fact or
otherwise deduced); see also ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW, AN
ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION 142 (1996) (rejecting reductivism).
7. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 85–90 (explaining his reference to a basic good is not yet to mean
a moral good, and listing seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability
(friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion).
8. Id. at 67.
9. See id. (stating a discussion of self-evidence would need to be more complex).
10. See id. (discussing how self-evidence supports fundamental concepts, including
completeness).
11. Id. at 67–68.
12. Id. at 68.
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Part I considers the place of self-evidence in Finnis’ theory of natural law.
It argues that the existence of self-evident principles of practical reason is
the foundation of his theory. Part II examines the conceptions of selfevidence that Finnis relies on in constructing his theory. It argues that he
equivocates between two incompatible conceptions of self-evidence. And,
Part III explains why Finnis cannot maintain neither pre-modern nor
modern conceptions of self-evidence, and it suggests some implications of
his equivocation.
A. Locating Finnis’ Claim to Self-Evidence
This part of the essay shows that the Finnis reconstruction of natural law
relies on the claim of self-evidence as its logical foundation. It makes two
claims: (1) Finnis views the separation of fact and value (the naturalistic
fallacy), which began with David Hume, as an achievement of modern
philosophy.13 Finnis believes the legal positivists reject natural law theories
because they violate the separation of fact and value by attempting to draw
moral norms from the facts about human nature; (2) To overcome their
rejection, Finnis argues that seven basic pre-moral goods (the Basic Goods)
are desirable goals for human beings to achieve.14 Finnis argues that the
validity of these Basic Goods is established through their self-evidence.15
The epistemological foundation of his theory of natural law is the claim of
the self-evident Basic Goods.16
1.

The Separation of Fact and Value

Finnis begins his reconstruction of the natural law by acknowledging his
acceptance of David Hume’s distinction between fact and value.17 He
quotes the famous passage from Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that

13. Id. at 36–38.
14. Id. at 85–90.
15. See id. at 92 (arguing these Basic Goods to be self-evident and that each Basic Good cannot
be reduced to another).
16. See id. at 90 (asserting the other forms of “Good” all derive themselves from the seven Basic
Goods).
17. Id. at 36–38.
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instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it
should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it . . . his small
attention would . . . let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.18

Finnis reads this passage as establishing an absolute separation between facts
and norms.19 Finnis writes, “there can be no valid deduction of a normative
conclusion without a normative principle and thus . . . [the] first practical
principles cannot be derived from metaphysical speculations.”20 The claim
advanced here is that the first principle of the Finnis reconstruction of
natural law is self-evidence.
Finnis begins by accepting the positivist claim that the divide between
fact and values is an absolute metaphysical dichotomy.21 He attributes the
separation of fact and value to David Hume.22 On Hume’s analysis,
concepts are a type of “idea,” and ideas are mental representations of
objects.23 Factual ideas are ones that resemble some state of affairs in the
real world.24 Ideas can become associated with moral sentiments
(emotional state), but there are no moral facts since the sentiment is
representing no moral object. The moral good is merely a sentiment that
resembles nothing in the external world. The separation between fact and
value is a claim about the legitimacy of an inference (that p cannot be
inferred from q). In the early twentieth century, however, Hume’s claim was
given greater significance by the widely influential work of Rudolph Carnap,
who worked in a Kantian framework.25 Carnap followed the standard
18. Id. at 36–37.
19. See id. at 37 (analyzing Hume’s proposition to mean that no moral conclusion can come
from a non-moral premise).
20. John Finnis & Germain Grisez, The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny,
26 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 24 (1981); accord LISSKA supra note 6, at 162 (1996) (“Finnis is convinced that
reductivism entails adopting the is/ought problem of deriving an ‘ought’ prescription from an ‘is’
proposition.”).
21. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 36–37.
22. Id.
23. DAVID HUMES, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 1 (L. A. Selby-Bigge eds., 1888).
24. Id. at 3.
25. STEWART SHAPIRO, THINKING ABOUT MATHEMATICS 4, 124–32 (2000).
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interpretations of Kant that conceive of value judgments as imperatives
(following Kant’s derivation of the Categorical Imperative).26 On this
reading, to say “x is wrong” is equivalent to saying “do not do x” (i.e., it is
an imperative). As such, it contains no factual content. Kant categorized
such claim as “analytic,” meaning that they are about the relations among
ideas.27 He contrasted analytic and synthetic propositions, which were
about facts. Carnap interpreted Hume’s distinction between fact and value
to be a metaphysical separation between analytic and synthetic
propositions.28 Carnap’s dichotomy was influential in logical positivism
and appears to have been accepted by Finnis.29 He accepts the
dichotomous separation between facts and values, which he believes poses
a critical challenge to any theory of natural law. Finnis notes that the
dichotomy between fact and value has been cited as the reason for rejecting
natural law by the leading positivist jurisprudents of the twentieth century:
Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Joseph Raz.30
According to the legal positivists, the natural law theories attempt to
illegitimately derive the validity of law, a factual claim, from claims about
moral validity.31 Finnis quotes the following passage by Raz, describing the
positivists’ view of natural law:
Kelsen correctly points out that according to natural law theories there is no
specific notion of legal validity. The only concept of validity is validity
according to natural law, i.e., moral validity. Natural lawyers can only judge a
law as morally valid, that is, just or morally invalid, i.e., wrong. They cannot
say of a law that it is legally valid but morally wrong. If it is wrong and unjust,
it is also invalid in the only sense of validity they recogni[z]e.32

26. This section of the essay draws from Hillary Putnam’s analysis of the Kantian evolution of
the Fact/Value dichotomy. See HILLARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY 16–18 (2002) (arguing that Kantian philosophers have agreed that “value judgments have
the character of imperatives”).
27. Id. at 16–17.
28. Id. at 18.
29. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 36–38.
30. Id. at 26.
31. PUTNAM, supra note 26, at 16–18.
32. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 26.
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An influential reading of Finnis by Anthony Lisska33 describes Finnis’
natural law theory as a radical reconstructing of natural law.34 Finnis is
“undercut[ing] the functional view of Aristotelian ethics by suggesting that
the metaphysical support normally used to interpret natural law in Aristotle
and Aquinas is misguided.”35 Lisska asserts that traditional natural law
theories, including that of Thomas Aquinas, are based on some
understanding of human nature. Finnis describes these theories as being
“reductive” since they reduce moral meaning to factual claims about human
nature. For Finnis, it is this reduction that must be avoided to avoid the
improper inference of moral value from fact. In his reconstruction, Finnis
sought to develop a fresh perspective that would free natural law from
ontology to avoid the reduction of moral claims to factual claims, and
thereby make natural law acceptable to the weathering critiques brought by
the positivist philosophers.36 His approach to overcoming the positivist
critique of natural law involves the assertion of moral principles that are not
derived from factual claims. In his reconstruction, the foundational
principles of natural law are not reductive. They are self-evident, which
means they are known immediately to be true in themselves.37 He calls
these self-evident moral principles the basic forms of good.38
2.

The First Principles of Practical Reason

To summarize, Finnis acknowledges the validity of the absolute
separation of fact and value and locates it as the common commitment of
positivist philosophers. It is a fundamental challenge for natural law
theories that seek to derive moral values from some understanding of facts
about the nature of human existence. More precisely, they reject the claim
that the moral good is derivable from an account of how human beings
flourish in the sense of fully developing their nature as human beings.39
The natural law promotes morally good lives in which the conditions for
33. LISSKA, supra note 6, at 139–65.
34. See id. at 139–65 (describing Finnis’ reconstruction of natural law theory and differences in
his theory from those of other philosophers, such as Aristotle and Aquinas).
35. Id. at 139.
36. Id. at 142–45 (analyzing Finnis’ beliefs about traditional natural law theories and his
reconstruction of natural law theory).
37. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 59.
38. See id. at 59 (introducing the idea of “self-evident . . . forms of human good that . . . are . . .
irreducibly basic”).
39. See LISSKA, supra note 6, at 142–43 (explaining Finnis’ rejection of the powerful temptation
to “envisage ethics reductively”).
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fulfilling the transcendent nature of human beings is maximally achieved in
society. The natural law is concerned with describing morality in terms of
virtues that help achieve the optimal function by maximally pursuing
dispensations towards self-evident goods.40
Drawing from Germain Grisez’s work on moral first principles, Finnis
developed an approach to natural law that sought self-evident first principles
of practical reason that could serve as a foundation. Grisez and Finnis
argued that Aquinas understood that the first principles of practical reason
are self-evident. Robert P. George explains that:
According to Grisez and Finnis, Aquinas correctly understood that the
underived (per se nota and indemonstrabilia) first and most basic principles of
practical reason direct human choosing and acting towards intelligible human
goods—the various irreducible aspects of human well-being and fulfillment
which provide more-than-merely-instrumental reasons for action—and away
from there privations. These first principles (and the basic human goods to
which they refer in directing our choosing and acting—friendship, knowledge,
critical aesthetic appreciation, skillful performances of various types, etc.) are
not themselves moral norms. (Knowledge of them is moral knowledge
incipiently, but only incipiently.) Rather, they guide and govern all coherent
practical thinking, whether it results in morally upright action (e.g., visiting an
ailing colleague in the hospital simply as an act of friendship) or immoral
action (e.g., telling a lie to protect the reputation of a friend who has done
something disgraceful).41

These basic pre-moral goods (the Basic Goods)42 are the foundation of the
Finnis reconstruction of natural law. Since these basic principles of practical
reason are underived, they avoid the reduction of moral values to factual
propositions that the legal positivists rejected.43
40. See REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW supra note 2, at 2 (outlining the basis of natural law and
the moral norms that form basic, self-evident “goods of human persons”).
41. Id.
42. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 85–90 (explaining his reference to a basic good is not yet to mean
a moral good, and listing seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability
(friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion).
43. Finnis describes the defining criteria of the Basic Goods in three interrelated claims:
(i) what I mean by ‘basic value’ and ‘basic practical principle’, (ii) how such values and principles
enter into any consideration of good reasons for action and any full description of human
conduct, and (iii) the sense in which such basic values are obvious (self-evident) and even
unquestionable.
Id. at 59.
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These three claims form the foundation of the natural law for Finnis. He
views the Basic Goods as (i) principles of practical reason; that (ii) are
dispositions to be pursued; and (iii) are self-evidently valid.44 Each feature
of Basic Goods must be considered for its significance to the logical
structure of the natural law. Each of these claims contributes to the
foundation of his theory:
a.

Basic Goods are the First Principles of Practical Reason

The Basic Goods are not rules; they are “basic practical principles.”45 He
explains:
Basic practical principles, such as that knowledge is a good to pursued and
ignorance is to avoided, do not play the same role as rules do, in practical
reasoning or the explanation and description of intelligent action. A basic
practical principle serves to orient one’s practical reasoning, and can be
instantiated (rather than ‘applied’) in indefinitely many, more specific, practical
principles and premi[ses]. Rather than restrict, it suggests new horizons for
human activity.”46

Finnis illustrates this claim with his cardinal example of a Basic Good, which
is “knowledge.”47 He claims, “[k]nowledge is something good to have.
Being well-informed and clear-headed is a good way to be. Muddle and
ignorance are to be avoided. These are formulations of a practical
principle.”48 By practical principle, he means a principle that guides action
toward some purpose. Attaining knowledge can be a guiding principle
because it defines a goal for action.
b.

Basic Goods are Dispositions

The Basic Goods are dispositions to act since they are the goals sought
in purposeful human action.49 In this sense, they reflect human nature as
the goals that human beings seek as good to achieve, but they are not derived
from claims about human nature. Finnis believes this way of viewing the
essence of human nature, as a set of dispositions, is consistent with

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 63 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 90–91.
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Aquinas’s description of essences as dispositions.50 A dispositional view of
essence is a necessary condition for discussing the conception of essences
in Aquinas.51 For Aquinas, an essence is “a set of dispositional qualities.”52
These dispositional qualities are the natural necessities that must be
acknowledged by the primary rules of the law.53 Basic Goods identify the
dispositional qualities that evolve from human nature.54
Lisska observes this approach to essences has some similarity to Hart’s
concept of natural necessities.55 He writes:
In The Concept of Law, Hart ponders what he refers to as the “core of good
sense” in natural law thinking. This he spells out in terms of “natural
necessities,” which he refers to as the “minimum content of natural law.” Like
Hobbes before him, Hart considers “survival” to be the central linchpin in
human existence and the “necessity” which in principle cannot be overridden
by the law. Hart attempts to identify certain salient facts about the human
species—what existentialist philosophers might call the human condition—
which make moral and legal systems understandable and necessary.56

For Hart, these natural necessities must be accounted for in the primary rules,
“while the secondary rules of procedure which are necessary conditions for
any mature legal system.”57 This similarity to Hart suggests that Finnis’
approach might succeed as a counter to the criticism of natural law leveled
by Hart and other positivists.
c.

Basic Goods are Apodictic

Finnis believes that the Basic Goods are the foundation from which all
other claims of practical reason can be established.58 If one understands
the seven principles that are the Basic Goods, then one immediately knows
it empowers an individual agent when it is possessed and that such

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
LISSKA, supra note 6, at 96.
Id.
Id. at 90–91.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 94–96.
LISSKA, supra note 6, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 20.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 90.
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empowerment is better to have than to lack.59 In this sense, the Basic
Goods are apodictic. Lisska explains:
Finnis suggests that the mental process of determining the goods renders
them “objective.” The goods to be obtained are self-evident—what Aquinas
refers to as per se nota propositions. Since the propositions are per se nota, they
are not reducible to facts about human nature.60

The mental process intended to guarantee objectivity is “cool reflection” as
Lisska later notes.61 The apodicticity of the Basic Goods overcomes the
fact/value dichotomy by deriving the Basic Goods purely as necessary
dispositions to act for desirable ends. Joseph Boyle explains that the Basic
Goods “function in practical thought much as does the principle of nonThus, the Finnis
contradiction in thinking more generally.”62
reconstruction of natural law stands on its own as a system of propositions
that rests on the self-evidence of the Basic Goods.
Finnis illustrates the apodicticity of the Basic Goods through a
description of knowledge. Finnis writes of the Basic Good of knowledge:
Is it not the case that knowledge is really a good, an aspect of authentic human
flourishing, and that the principle which expresses its value formulates a real
(intelligent) reason for action? It seems clear that such indeed is the case, and
that there are no sufficient reasons for doubting it to be so. The good of
knowledge is self-evident, obvious. It cannot be demonstrated, but equally it
needs no demonstration.63

Lisska notes that Finnis is careful to point out that no account of the basic
good of knowledge can establish it as such.64 Any attempt to “reduce”
knowledge to some fact about it—such as a psychological analysis65 or an
appeal to its universality66 misses the mark, since “[t]he soundness of an
answer to a particular question is never established . . . by the answer to [an]
59. Id.
60. LISSKA, supra note 6, at 145.
61. Id. at 158.
62. Joseph Boyle, On the Most Fundamental Principle of Morality, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW
supra note 2, at 56, 59.
63. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 64–65.
64. LISSKA, supra note 6, at 157–59.
65. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 65 (noting the psychological inclination to seek truth does not
determine whether knowledge is a basic good).
66. See id. at 66 (rejecting moral skepticism and accepting moral cognitivism).
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entirely different question . . . .”67 Anyone who understands the meaning of
knowledge would know that it is desirable for it to be pursued because the
connection is immediately understood as logically necessary. The truth of
the Basic Goods is not assertorical, something that happens to be the case.
They are apodotic because it must be the case. The apodicticity of the Basic
Goods results from their self-evidence—from their immediate claim to
logical necessity.68 That knowledge is good to have, cannot be denied by
someone who knows what knowledge is because to do so would be illogical.
The apodicticity of the Basic Goods is fundamental to what Finnis intends
by claiming that they are self-evident.
Some clarification of this point can be taken from Robert P. George’s
defense of the Finnis reconstruction against the critique brought by Michael
Perry.69 According to George, Perry misunderstands Finnis’ conception of
the Basic Goods by viewing them instrumentally, as means to the end of
human flourishing.70 In the sense that George ascribes to Perry, the truth
of the Basic Goods would be assertoric.71 But George argues that this is
not a correct interpretation of Finnis, for the Basic Goods (note that George
refers to them as “basic values”) are ends in themselves. He explains:
Perry seems to understand “value(s)” as providing reasons for action, but he
differs from Finnis in treating flourishing as a value. Underlying this
difference is a radically different conceptions of flourishing. Perry conceives
of flourishing not as constituted by irreducible values (for example, friendship,
knowledge, life, health and beauty), but rather as itself the ultimate value.
Under his conception, Finnis’ “basic” values are proximate reasons for choice
and action. They are means of flourishing, rather than ends-in-themselves.
As means they are instrumentally, rather than intrinsically[,] valuable. Their
choiceworthiness derives from their capacity to produce flourishing. Contrary
to Finnis’ view, they are neither underived nor self-evident; their value can be
inferred from their capacity to produce flourishing. The proposition that

67. Id. at 65.
68. Id. at 64–65.
69. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 264 (2001) (comparing the
differences between Perry and Finnis’ understandings of value); MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS AND LAW 10 (1988) (“We should reject moral skepticism and accept moral cognitivism,
which affirms that there can be moral knowledge.”).
70. GEORGE, supra note 69, at 264.
71. See id. (emphasizing the argument that knowledge is always good, regardless of what
reasoning the thinker employs to understand knowledge).
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knowledge conduces to flourishing may function as a minor premise that leads
to the conclusion that knowledge is a value.72

George contends Finnis views the Basic Goods as comprehensive ends in
themselves, in the sense that they are not aimed at some more complete view
of human fulfillment.73 They are sought in their own right for their own
desirability.74 And, they are known to be so because they are apodictic.
To summarize, Finnis explains that from this common view of natural
law, “it is a necessary truth that every law has moral worth.”75 This view is
rejected by positivists, who seek to describe legal validity apart from moral
terms because they do not want to conflate factual claims about the law with
moral claims about what the law ought to be.76 Finnis counters that the
truth of natural law principles is not derived at all; they are immediately
known to be true (apodictic) because they are self-evident.77 Finnis does
not defend the metaphysical basis for the natural law ethics of Aristotle or
Aquinas. Instead, he argues that, since ethics is a form of practical reason,
it can be separated from the hylomorphic, metaphysically teleological
structure of Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, and stand on its own
as a system of apodictic propositions that rests on the foundational intuition
of the Basic Goods.78 The claim that Basic Goods are “self-evident” means
they are not (and in principle cannot be) derived from more basic claims of
practical reason or from any factual claims.79 Critically, they avoid the
improper inference of moral value from the facts about human nature
precisely because they are self-evident, precisely because they are apodictic
and therefore not derived or derivable from factual propositions.80 The
apodictic character of the Basic Goods is thus the foundation for Finnis’
defense of natural law against the legal positivists.81 It is also the foundation
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 26 (internal quotation omitted).
76. Id. at 29 n.6.
77. See id. at 32 (expressing how natural law principles are always true).
78. See id. at 23–25 (explaining that the origins of natural law derive from principles of universal
good, practical reasonableness, and a set of general moral standards).
79. See id. at 73–75 (noting the idea that knowledge as a good to be pursued cannot be
demonstrated because it is self-evident).
80. Id. at 75.
81. See id. at 27 (“The legal validity of positive law is derived from its rational connections with
natural law, and this connection holds good, normally if and only if the law originates in a way which
is legally valid.”).
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of his claim for universality of his ethics because he holds that the
recognition of the Basic Goods is, in principle, “objective” (i.e., universally
recognizable) for all rational creatures.82 It is thus his contention that
recognition of the Basic Goods is the foundation from which all other
claims of practical reason might be given rigorous scrutiny.83
II. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-EVIDENCE
Despite the critical role that self-evidence plays in his theory of natural
law, Finnis acknowledges that it is controversial. As noted above, he writes,
“[b]ut is there not something fishy about appeal to self-evidence?”84 While
he suggests that a full explication of the argument for self-evidence exceeds
the scope of his work, he “observe[s] in passing” that modern geometry
(citing, notably David Hilbert)85 makes use of “self-evidence” to identify
fundamental concepts and (notably) some criteria for completeness. Finnis
implies that the natural sciences rest on elementary formal logic, which he
takes to be self-evident.86 He argues for self-evidence, through what he
takes to be basic, sound principles of reason in any empirical discipline.87
Despite the success of Finnis’ program, the “fishiness” of his
conceptualization of self-evidence remains to be explored and defended.
A close reading reveals that Finnis draws his conceptions of self-evidence
from two sources. One is the medieval conception of propositio per se nota
(propositions that speak for themselves). Finnis says the Basic Goods are
self-evident in the same sense that Aquinas refers to the principles of natural
law as propositio per se nota.88 Therefore, they are not reducible to facts about
human nature. However, when Finnis defends his appeal to self-evidence,
he draws an analogy to the concept of self-evident definitions in
mathematical logic (he notes David Hilbert’s and Oswald Veblen’s
geometries in particular)89 and also what Finnis calls “principles or norms
of sound judgment.”90 Self-evidence, however, is conceptualized quite

82. See id. at 69 (holding that knowledge, as a basic good, is not demonstratable because it is
self-evident).
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 67.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 67–68.
87. Id. at 68.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id. at 68. Finnis also identifies seven self-evident principles of empirical disciplines:
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differently among these sources. Although Finnis does not consider the
significance of these differences, the differences are substantial, and given
the critical role that the concept of self-evidence plays in his theory, the
significance must be given rigorous consideration if the theory is to be
accepted. While Finnis acknowledges as much, he does not take up the task,
suggesting that a full explication of the argument for self-evidence exceeds
the scope of the book.91 Comparing medieval and modern conceptions of
self-evidence is the goal of this part of the essay.
A. Finnis and Leonine Thomism
To appreciate Finnis’ relation to Thomas Aquinas, it is useful to consider
Finnis’ relation to the Roman Catholic intellectual tradition. As a committed
Catholic, the Roman Catholic intellectual tradition is foundational for
Finnis, and thus the desire to see his philosophy as an extension of that
tradition should be given some attention at the start of this examination of
his foundational concept of self-evidence because, as will be shown, there
are Catholic attitudes and commitments that are at stake in the positions
that Finnis develops.

(1) Deductive inferences are to be relied on and followed;
(2) Adequate reasons must be given to support a belief;
(3) Self-defeating theses are to be abandoned;
(4) Phenomena are to be considered real unless there is some reason to think otherwise;
(5) A full description of data is to be preferred over a partial description;
(6) A method of interpretation that proves workable should be relied on in similar
situations; and
(7) Simple, predictive, and accessible accounts should be accepted over others.
Id. at 68.
These seven principles, Finnis takes to be objectively true. Id. at 69. They are not sentiments or
intuitions for him. Id. Finnis observes that such principles are not demonstrable, for they are
presupposed or deployed in anything that we would count as a demonstration. Id. “They do not
describe the world. But although they cannot be verified by opening one’s eyes and taking a look, they
are obvious—obviously valid—to anyone who has experience of inquiry into matters of fact or of
theoretical (including historical and philosophical) judgment; they do not stand in need of
demonstration.” Id. This conclusion is offered without much analysis. In fact, if the conclusion is
about self-evident principles, then no analysis should be available, nor would presenting analysis do
much to further the case for accepting the validity of the principles.
91. See generally id. at 67–73 (identifying the complexity in thoroughly discussing the principles
of self-evidence, while providing a brief analysis of self-evidence and addressing potential
counterarguments to the concept of self-evidence).
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The Catholic context of Finnis’ thought is formed by the 1879 encyclical
of Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris,92 who called on Catholic seminaries to
return to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas as a check against what he took
to be the corrupting influences of modernity.93 In drafting this document,
Leo XIII was influenced by Joseph Kleutgen, a theologian of the period
who was particularly concerned about rejecting Cartesian philosophy.94
Kleutgen argued that the radical skepticism of Descartes’s philosophical
method had the effect of severing the mind from Being, which was assured
by scripture to be God’s creation and as such, morally Good. On Kleutgen’s
reading, Descartes asserted that the proper method for philosophy was to
first draw into doubt all that can be doubted, which he believed was the
source of a radical rupture in philosophy.95 Philosophical knowledge
(natural theology) of God was not a possibility under the Cartesian system,
nor any philosophy honoring its legacy.96 He believed that philosophy had

92. Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy,
to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World in Grace and Communion with the
Apostolic See (Aug. 4, 1879), https://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html [https://perma.cc/2GEQ-7QAD].
93. Id. at 25.
94. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY 38–39 (1991).
He argues that Kleutgen caused Thomism to confront all of the problems of post-Cartesian
philosophy. Id. at 39. The importance of Thomas, for MacIntyre, lies not in his ability to provide an
epistemology for refuting modernity, but in the development of an integration of Augustinian and
Aristotelian metaphysical systems. Thomism unites, harmonizes, and synthesizes the metaphysics and
epistemologies of Augustine and Aristotle but does not develop into an epistemology of justified
knowledge, which has been a hallmark of modern thought. Id. For Aquinas, epistemology takes place
within the context of a set of theological presuppositions that are taken as given. Id. The epistemology
of modernity seeks a vantage point outside of presuppositions and prejudice from which
epistemological claims can be justified. Id. at 33. Thomism relies on a tradition that gives meaning to
Scripture, teases out its insights, and provides warrants for believing in its conclusion. Kleutgen’s error
is that “[he] instead treats Aquinas as presenting a finished system whose indebtedness to earlier writers
is no more than an accidental feature of it.” Id. at 38. Asking Thomism to do the work of refuting
Cartesian epistemology distorts the nuanced synthesis of Thomism by “opening an epistemological
question for which there is no place in Aquinas’s scheme of thought.” Id. According to MacIntyre,
this led to a distortion in his thought that developed into a variety of anti-modern Leonine Thomism.
Id. at 37. By adopting Suarez’s misreading of Aquinas, MacIntyre argues, Kleutgen created the
conditions that led to a fracturing of Thomism into a plurality of different responses to modernity. Id.
95. MACINTYRE supra note 94, at 59; see also GERALD A. MCCOOL, FROM UNITY TO
PLURALISM: THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THOMISM 15 (1999) (“[M]odern philosophies [the]
newer theologies employed began with the Cartesian cogito.”).
96. MACINTYRE supra note 94, at 58–75; see also MCCOOL supra note 96, at 21–23 (discussing
post-Cartesian philosophy); STEPHEN MENN, DESCARTES AND AUGUSTINE 379–80 (1998)
(contemplating the lingering doubt left over from these earlier hypotheses).
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gone astray and that the result had been a crisis for European thought.97
Most of the philosophers who took up Leo XIII’s call to renew Thomism
(known as the “Leonine Thomists”) followed Kleutgen in viewing
modernity as a rupture in intellectual history and as a crisis for the Church.98
Although it was influential in many European seminaries and universities,
the Angelicum was at the center of these efforts to confront modern
philosophy.99 The Thomism that developed there sought to reverse these
modernizing trends by finding within the thought of Aquinas the
philosophical resources to combat modern philosophy.100
Finnis developed significantly as a philosopher during the period of the
greatest influence of Aeterni Patris, between 1910 and 1967. During that
period, canon law required clergy to swear an anti-modernist oath that was
promulgated by Pope Pius X on September 1, 1910 (it continued to be
enforced until Pope Paul VI abolished it in 1967).101 They were also
required to take examinations on Thomistic theology and philosophy set out
in “Twenty-Four Thomistic Theses.”102 These were divided into various
topics (ontology, psychology, theodicy, and so forth) that were intended to
demonstrate how Thomism established the existence of God through
natural reason (i.e., independent from faith).103 Implicit in the document is
the belief that natural reason is sufficient to answer the most important
theological questions.104 Faith is important for knowledge of the nature of
the divine but not for the moral life, which could be adequately known
through natural law discernable through natural reason and argument.
Catholic thought in this period was fully committed to a realist
epistemology that made possible a hylomorphic metaphysics and natural
97. MACINTYRE supra note 94, at 59.
98. FERGUS KERR, AFTER AQUINAS: VERSIONS OF THOMISM 18, 37 (2002) [hereinafter KERR,
AFTER AQUINAS].
99. FERGUS KERR, TWENTIETH-CENTURY CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS 1 (2007) [hereinafter
KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT.].
100. Id.
101. See generally Pope Pius, Pascendi Dominici Gregis: Encyclical of Pope Pius X on the Doctrines of the
Modernists, to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops and other Local Ordinaries in Peace and Communion
with the Apostolic See (Sep. 8, 1907) [hereinafter POPE PIUS X], http://w2.vatican.va/content/piusx/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gregis.html [https://perma.
cc/XA78-JQ9N] (attacking the modernist view); see also KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT., supra note 99,
at app. (presenting the whole oath written by Pope Pius X).
102. The 24 Thomistic Theses, CATH. APOLOGETIC INFO., http://www.catholicapologetics.info/
catholicteaching/philosophy/thomast.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
103. Id.
104. See id. (implying most theological questions can be answered with logic alone).
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theology.105
They opposed subjectivism, relativism, and the
personalization of faith.106 As Kerr puts it, “The history of twentiethcentury Catholic theology is the history of the attempted elimination of
theological modernism, by censorship, sackings and excommunications—
and the resurgence of issues that could not be represented by such
methods.”107 The resurgence of approaches that could not be successfully
repressed, to which Kerr refers, led to hotly contentious debates that are still
felt among Catholic intellectuals.108 Finnis’ precise location with respect to
Leonine Thomists can be debated, but it seems clear that his project of
reconstructing the natural law is sympathetic to the project of Leonine
Thomism.
1.

Catholic Commitments

A split between medieval and modern conceptions of self-evidence is
related to the rejection of modern philosophy by Neo-Scholastic Catholic
philosophers. The controversy centers on a disagreement over the concept
of intentionality.109 To gain some perspective on the relationship between
theories of perception and theories of natural law, it is useful to consider the
modern recovery of a medieval philosophical term, “intentio,” from which

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT., supra note 99, at 1.
Id. at 4–5.
Kerr describes the paradoxical nature of this period:

Paradoxically, the revival of Thomistic philosophy in the wake of Leo XIII’s directive, intended
to keep modern philosophy out of Catholicism, and especially German Romanticism, kept to very
much the same canons of rationality that we find in the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment ideal
was to attain timeless, universal and objective conclusions by exercising a unitary and ahistorical
form of reasoning. Similarly, neoscholastic theology “identified truth and life with immutability
and rationality; it opposed being to history and ignored concreteness in human life and in the
economy of salvation”. For neothomists, as for Enlightenment philosophers, appealing to
experience, tradition and historical studies was the wrong way to get to truth.
Id. at 2. Catholic thought in this period was fully committed to a realist epistemology that made
possible a hylomorphic metaphysics and natural theology. Id. at 4; see also text accompanying footnotes
108–09. The resurgence of approaches that could not be successfully repressed, to which Kerr refers,
led to hotly contentious debates that are still felt among Catholic intellectuals. Id. at 222.
109. Victor Caston, Connecting the Traditions, Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality, in DOMINIK
PERLER, ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY 23, 29 (2001) (“But there is an
even more fundamental problem still. Which concept of intentionality? The natural answer, of course,
is the concept of intentionality, that is, a correct grasp of what constitutes intentionality. But this is
precisely what our philosophers disagree about . . . .”).
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the modern word “intention” is derived.110 Although today the word
“intention” has a primarily psychological meaning, referring to purposive
goals, for the medieval philosopher, intentio referred to the object of
attention as it is represented to the mind.111 The belief that the external
world is mediated to the mind through some form of mental representation
is massively influential today.112 This was not always the case, however.113
The contemporary understanding owes a significant debt to Franz
Brentano. In Psychologie vom empirschen Standpunkt114 (Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint), Brentano sought to recover the medieval conception
of “intentio” for modern philosophy.115 Brentano was successful, and today,
the concept, now known as “intention,” is widely accepted as foundational
for thinking about consciousness.116 He did this in the context of
developing a scientific study of consciousness through an analysis of the
totality of mental awareness.117 For him, “philosophy is a descriptive study
of what is given in direct ‘self-evidence’ (Evidenz).”118 His project was to
develop an empirical study of that which is given to conscious awareness in
the lived experience of a phenomenon.119 The medieval concept of intentio
was useful for him because it was the term that the Scholastic philosophers
110. Caston, supra note 109, at 25 (2001).
111. See id. at 24–25 (Identifying the relevant uses of the word “intention” within the context
of philosophy).
112. Charles Siewert, Consciousness and Intentionality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE § 2,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ [https://perma.
cc/K57J-SEAG].
113. See Caston, supra note 109, at 23 (cataloging the discord among philosophers regarding the
idea of intentionality).
114. FRANZ BRENTANO, PSYCHOLOGIE VOM EMPIRISCHEN STANDPUNKT (1874).
115. In an oft-cited passage in the Psychologie, he wrote:
The data of our consciousness make up a world which, taken in its entirety, falls into two great
classes, the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena . . . . Every presentation . . . of
sensation or imagination offers an example of the mental phenomenon . . . . Thus hearing a
sound, seeing a colored object, sensing warm or cold, and the comparable states of imagination
as well, are examples of what I mean . . . . Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand,
are a color, a shape, a landscape, which I see; a musical chord, which I hear; heat, cold, odor,
which I sense . . . . These examples may suffice as concrete illustrations of the distinction between
the two classes.
BRENTANO, supra note 114, at 39–41.
116. See, e.g., Siewert, supra note 112, at § 9 (explaining how “[c]onsciousness is to be explained
as a form of intentionality . . . .”).
117. DERMOT MORAN, INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 8 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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used to refer to the ontological status of the mental objects that mediate the
external world through representation.120 They called these “intentional
objects” (esse intentionale).121 Brentano appropriated this concept, which he
explained this way:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and
what we would call . . . [the] reference [or relation] to a content, direction
toward an object (which is not to be understood as a reality [in this case]), or
immanent objectivity.122

Roger Scruton uses a simple example to explain the notion of “intentional
object:” “Whenever John is afraid, he is afraid of something; whenever he
thinks, he thinks about something; whenever he believes, he believes
propositions about something; whenever he is angry, he is angry about
something; whenever he has an experience, he has an experience of
something.”123 The “something” to which Scruton’s example refers, in
each case, is an object toward which the consciousness is directed.124
Experiences are the conscious awareness of something (an intentional
object), separate from the self, whether it is awareness of a past memory,
something currently perceived, or some mental construct such as a
prediction of a future event, or something imagined.125
Philosophers since the ancient Greeks distinguished between two types
of mental acts, which Scruton called primary and secondary.126 Scruton’s
stated examples are of primary mental acts.127 These are the mental acts
directed toward intentional objects.128 But, Brentano also recognized
secondary mental acts which are awareness directed toward selfconsciousness.129 “Following Aristotle’s analysis in De Anima, Brentano
holds that, in sensing, I am aware that I am sensing.”130 In making this
120.
121.
122.
123.
(1994).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Cf. Caston, supra note 109, at 25.
Id.
Siewert, supra note 112, at § 3.
ROGER SCRUTON, MODERN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY 215
Id.
See id. (“Every Mental State is directed towards an inexistent object.”).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 215.
Id.
Id.
MORAN, supra note 117, at 8.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss2/4

20

Lee: Self-Evidence in the Finnis Reconstruction of Natural Law

2020]

SELF-EVIDENCE IN FINNIS RECONSTRUCTION OF NATURAL LAW

433

distinction between primary and secondary mental acts, Brentano gets to the
heart of an issue that had long been debated in philosophy—what are the
relationships among the thing thought, the intentional object (esse
intentionale), the self-conscious mind, and reality?131 Or, more broadly
stated, how does the mind come to know the world, if at all? Brentano
found that this concept of intentio was used with philosophical meaning in
ancient sources.132 He writes:
Aristotle had already spoken of this psychical indwelling. In his book On the
Soul he says that what is experienced, as something experienced, is in the
experiencing subject; that the sense receives what is experienced without
matter; and that what is thought is in the understanding. In Philo, we likewise
find the doctrine of mental existence and inexistence; but because he confuses
this with existence in its proper sense, he arrives at the contradictory doctrine
of logos and Ideas. The same holds for the Neoplatonists. Augustine in his
doctrine of the verbum mentis and its issuing internally touches in this same
fact. Anselm does this in his famous ontological argument; and the fact that
he considered mental existence to be a real existence is held by many to be
the basis of his paralogism (cf. Ueberweg, Geschichte der Philosophie, II). Thomas
Aquinas teaches that what is thought is intentionally in the thinker, the object
of love in the lover, and what is desired in the desiring object, and he uses this
for theological ends. When Scripture speaks of the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit, he explains this as an intentional indwelling through love. And he even
attempts to find an analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession
ad intra of the Word and Spirit in the intentional inexistence which occurs in
thinking and loving.133

Thus, Brentano was aware of the development of intentio from Hellenistic
philosophy (Aristotle), through early Christian writers (Philo and Augustine)
and medieval philosophy (Anselm, Aquinas, and later Scholastic
thinkers).134 Intentionality, he suggests, is a persistent feature of attempts
to describe human consciousness.135 After Brentano, the philosophical
concept of intention is used to refer to the problems that intentio was

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Siewart, supra note 112, at 7.
Caston, supra note 109, at 23.
Id.
Id.
MORAN, supra note 117, at 8.
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intended to explore since ancient Greece.136 Thus, a closer examination of
this history is warranted for appreciating the presuppositions of
contemporary philosophy of mind.
a. The Aristotelian Conception of the Intentionality of
Perception
The concept of self-evidence is tied to perception, being evident, and thus
the understanding of how perception occurs is essential to the
conceptualization of self-evidence. The difference between ancient and
modern conceptualization turns on the difference between the realism of
ancient philosophers and the skepticism of modern philosophers. When
late medieval Scholastics, like Thomas Aquinas, rediscovered Aristotle’s
works on philosophy, they maintained the ontological realism of his
metaphysics.137 For the discussion here, an important claim is Aristotle’s
metaphysical conception of actual and potential. He argued that whatever
a substance might become must be a potential of what it is.138 He referred
to what a substance is as its “actuality.”139 Anthony Kenny explains,
“Aristotelians called the things which a substance is, or is doing, its
actualities; and the things which it can be, or can do, its potentialities.”140
And, he writes, “[v]ery roughly, predicates which contain the word ‘can’, or
a word with a modal suffix such as ‘-able’ or ‘-ible’, signify potentialities;
predicates which do not contain these words signify actualities.”141 For
example, a liquid substance such as water can be changed into a gas (steam)
by heating it.142 An Aristotelian would say that the actuality of water
contains the potentiality of steam.143
Aristotle used these concepts to think about change in substance.144
When ice melts or water evaporates, Aristotelians would say that “matter”
136. See generally Jacob Pierre, Intentionality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Feb. 8,
2019) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/intentionality/ [https://perma.cc/SJU9PDFZ] (explaining intentionality).
137. See generally ANTHONY KENNY, AQUINAS ON MIND 23 (1994) [hereinafter KENNY,
AQUINAS] (exploring Aquinas’s view of Aristotle’s conceptions of actual and potential).
138. Id. at 23.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. (explaining the concept of potentiality by considering how cream has the potential
to be turned into butter).
143. Id.
144. See id. (comparing the changes in cream to the changes in a policeman).
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has undergone a “substantial change.”145 According to Kenny, “[t]he stuff
which remains the same parcel of stuff throughout the change was called by
the Aristotelians matter.”146 Moreover, that which is altered during the
change was called the form.147 The term “substance” was used to refer to
matter formed in a particular way.148 The transformation from ice to water
was said to be a substantial change.149 The substantial form of matter
distinguishes the kind of thing it is.150 A stone is different from a snowball
because it has a different substantial form.151
Aristotle contrasted the concept of substantial change with the sort of
change that occurs when a thing acquires new attributes, such as when a
child learns to read.152 This second sort of change was called
“accidental.”153 The child acquires new potentials when the change occurs,
but the substantial form of the child is not changed.154 “In accidental
change,” Kenny explains, the object that undergoes change “is not matter,
but a substance of a particular kind: that is to say, matter informed by a
particular substantial form.”155 That is to say, as in substantial change (e.g.,
ice into water), where the object of change is matter, in accidental change
(e.g., the child learning to read), the object of change is the substantial form.
Kenny explains that “[a] man may be first P and then Q, but the predicate . . .
‘is human’ is true of him throughout.”156 What is changed is an accidental
form, which is an accidental form precisely because it is a form of the thing

145. See id. at 24. (describing changes, such as the example of cream turning to butter, are cases
from which “the Aristotelian notion of substantial change is derived”, and that “the stuff which
remains the same parcel of stuff throughout the change” is called “matter”).
146. Id.
147. See id. (“The matter takes first one form and then another: first it is cream and then it is
butter. When it is cream, the Aristotelians said, it has the substantial form of cream, and when it is
butter, it has the substantial form of butter.”).
148. See id. (stating that “what changes . . . is not matter, but a substance of a particular kind”).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See generally id. (discussing the concept of substantial form).
152. See id. (describing accidental change as compared to substantial change through the
example of a man learning Greek, considered an accidental change).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 23–24.
155. Id. at 24.
156. See id. (comparing how the “stuff which remains the same parcel of stuff throughout the
[substantial] change was called by the Aristotelians matter” to how the “form which [a thing] retains
throughout [an accidental] change [is called] its substantial form”) (emphasis added).
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that can be changed without altering the type of thing it is.157 Thus,
Aristotle’s theory of the potency and act is rooted in this multi-layered
account of form and matter, which he applied to an analysis of the
metaphysics and “ontology of psuche and of nous.”158
Aristotle uses this metaphysics of form and substance to understand the
nature of human perception.159 It is a distinctive characteristic of his
philosophy that he did not believe that forms had any actuality apart from
the particular.160 “Only particulars can properly be said to exist; and
[so] . . . the reality of the individual is much more strongly marked . . . than
it is in Plato’s [philosophy].”161 That is to say, throughout his philosophy,
Aristotle stresses the existence of individuals, however, this also entails the
enduring importance of the universal over the particular because individuals
are distinguishable from each other only by virtue of accidental traits.162
What matters for the human mind is the species because knowledge is only
possible for forms abstracted from individuals. Although Aristotle affirms
that individuals truly exist, the individual is but a fleeting union of matter
and form.163 Individuals pass away, but the form of the species is what
continues to be intelligible to the intellect.

157. See id. (defining accidental change as change of accidental form that occurs without altering
the substantial form of the thing undergoing the change). In his Lublin Lectures, John Paul II (née Karol
Wojtyla) wrote of the Aristotelian theory of potency and act:
With the help of this metaphysical theory [of potency and act] and using the principle of analogy,
the peripatetic-scholastic philosophy explains every change both in the physical and moral order,
regarding both material and spiritual beings. Every becoming and change consists in a being’s
transition from potency to an act—potency meaning a certain imperfection of a [human] being
which is perfected through an act.
JAROSLAW KUPCZAK, DESTINED FOR LIBERTY: THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
KAROL WAJTYLA/ JOHN PAUL II, at 40 (2000).
158. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, De Anima and its Recent Interpreters, in AMÉLIE OKSENBERG
RORTY & MARTHA NUSSBAUM, ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA 7 (1999).
159. See ETIENNE GILSON, THE SPIRIT OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (1991) (explaining
Aristotle’s analysis of humanity and his recognition of the substance of men and the form of humanity).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. (“In the system of Aristotle[,] the unreality and accidental character of the individual
physical being as compared with the necessity of the pure acts and the eternity of species are no less
evident.”).
163. See id. (stating that though Aristotle recognizes individuals, he also recognizes that they are
“a mere substitute for the unity of the species” and that “[e]ach is born, lives a brief span, and
disappears forever without leaving a trace behind”).
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Applying this to his account of perception, Aristotle asks: What is
changed by perception, the perceiving organ, or the thing perceived?164 He
concludes that the sense organ undergoes some sort of alteration by the act
of perception.165 Accordingly, Aristotle treats perception as an interaction
between the agency of the thing perceived and the passive reception of the
sense organ. He speaks of the sense organ receiving the form of the thing
perceived, and to that extent, becoming like the thing perceived.166 Thus,
for Aristotle, the act of perception involves the acquisition by the sense
organ of the form of the thing perceived.167 The sense organ is thus said
to have the potential to receive the form of the thing perceived, and where
such potential is lacking, for example as when a human being fails to hear a
high-pitched dog whistle, the perception does not occur. The intellect
receives the form of an object in the external world, and in this way, it is a
representation of the world. This representational theory of perception is
characteristic of the commonplace view that was developed by medieval
thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas.168
b.

Intentionality in Scholastic Thought

It is generally recognized that neo-scholastic philosophers substantially
developed the concept of perception.169 Following the Aristotelian view,
Aquinas defined intentionality within the context of the metaphysics of
potential and actual; however, Aquinas also extended Aristotle’s conception
of perception to include an account of the mind.170 Aquinas defined
164. ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA IN THE VERSION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE AND THE
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 233–34 (Kenelm Foster & Silvester Humphries trans., Yale
University Press, 1965) (inferring the question from Aristotle’s questioning of sensation in general).
165. Id. at 337.
166. Id. at 337–39.
167. Id.
168. KENNY, AQUINAS, supra note 137, at 35.
169. ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF PERCEPTION, AN ANALYTIC
RECONSTRUCTION 15 (2016).
170. John Haldane states the following about the importance of the Aristotelian approach to
intentionality:
[G]iven the present day interest in the “aboutness” of thought, it is worth noting that . . . Aquinas
[offers] a turn upon the nature of intentionality and its difference from physical relations. (Indeed,
the very term and concept originate in the medieval notion of esse intentionale, the ‘intentional being’
of thoughts.).
John Haldane, History: Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy of Mind, in A COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 335 (Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Oxford: Blackwell 1994).
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intentionality in terms of “the immaterial intentional existence of forms in
the mind.”171 For Aquinas, mental states are about forms that exist
immaterially in the mind.172 Anthony Kenny describes Aquinas’s position
this way:
[W]hen I think of redness, what makes my thought be a thought of redness is
the form of redness. When I think of a horse, similarly, it is the form of horse
which makes the thought be a thought of a horse and not of a cow. What
makes the thought of a horse the thought of a horse is the same thing as makes
a real horse a horse: namely, the form of horse. The form exists,
individualized and enmattered, in the real horse; it exists, immaterial and
universal, in my mind. In the one case it has esse naturale, existence in nature;
in the mind it has a different kind of existence, esse intentionale.173

Elsewhere, Kenny explains that Aquinas is not arguing that the esse
intentionale is a representation of something extra-mental.174 He writes, “An
intentio is not a representation, even though Aquinas sometimes calls it a
likeness, or [similitude], of the object perceived.”175 Kenny is at pains to
argue that, for Aquinas, there is no intermediary between the perceiver and
the thing perceived.176 He writes that “if I pop a sweet in my mouth, my
tasting sweetness . . . is one and same thing as its tasting sweet to
me . . . .”177 A slogan used by Aquinas is “Intellectus in actu est intelligibile in
actu: ‘The actuality of the power of thinking is the very same as the actuality
of the object of thought.’”178 It is Aquinas’s purpose in stating this truism
to thwart “the naïve representationalism that is tempting in this area.”179
Kenny points out that intellectual thought is indirect for Aquinas because
the actuality of individuals is achieved through material existence, but the

171. Anthony Kenny, Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein, in THOMAS AQUINAS,
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 243 (Brian Davies ed., 2002) [hereinafter Kenny,
Intentionality].
172. See id. at 243–44 (describing mental states when thinking of a physical item or being, stating
that “[t]he form exists, individualized and enmattered, in the real [thing]; it exists, immaterial and
universal, in my mind.”).
173. Id.
174. Anthony Kenny, Medieval Philosophy, in A NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 234
(2005) [hereinafter Kenny, Medieval].
175. Id.
176. Id. at 234–35.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 238.
179. Id. at 234–35.
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immediate object of knowledge is the form of the species.180 That is to say
that while one experiences the variations of individuals, such as Socrates,
concepts describe species.181 Kenny writes, “The senses perceive
accidental forms such as colour and shape; the immediate knowledge is
form, such as humanity.”182 For this reason, “[a]n accurate account of
Aquinas’ theory of intentionality has to give full weight to his thesis that
there is no intellectual knowledge of individuals,” but there has been a great
deal of disagreement regarding how the mind can know individuals at all
when the intellect can grasp only intellectual abstractions from the forms of
particular beings.183
This question implicates broader questions about how natural beings and
intentional beings are related under Thomistic ontology. Kenny’s solution
looks to Aquinas’s account of the individuation of material beings, which
for him, is achieved through space and time.184 That is, for him, material
things are individual because they cannot occupy the same place at the same
time.185 But, this approach to individuation allows for material objects to
be identified by pointing, which is non-conceptual and extra-linguistic. In
fact, Kenny argues, individuals can be identified with certainty only by
pointing at them.186 He concludes, therefore, that Aquinas is an anti-realist
in the sense that he believes that certain knowledge of the world is not fully
expressible in language, and in that sense, the individual is not fully
intelligible.187 That is, since we might identify a material object with
certainty only by pointing to it, Kenny concludes the mind is incapable of
certain knowledge of beings through intellection alone.188 This conclusion
holds significance for thinking about the way non-intentional awareness
might play a role in the philosophy of mind.

180. Id. at 237.
181. See id. (“[W]hat the intellect grasps directly by the intellectual idea is the universal; but
indirectly it grasps individuals to which phantasms belong. And that is how it forms the proposition
‘Socrates is human’.”).
182. Id.
183. Kenny, Intentionality, supra note 171, at 249.
184. Id. at 244.
185. Id. at 44–47.
186. See Kenny, Medieval, supra note 174, at 237 (“Only by pointing, or taking you to see him,
or reminding you of an occasion when you met, can I make clear to you which person I have in mind;
and pointing and vision and memory are outside the realm of pure intellectual thought.”).
187. Kenny, Intentionality, supra note 171, at 251.
188. Id. at 250.
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This opening to the non-intentional is central to the critique of NeoScholasticism advanced by Alasdair MacIntyre. He is particularly critical of
“epistemologizing” Thomistic thought by making it serve essentially
modern purposes for which it was not intended.189 MacIntyre argues that
the importance of Thomas lies not in his ability to provide an epistemology
for refuting modernity, but in the development of an integration of
Augustinian and Aristotelian metaphysical systems.190 Thomism unites,
harmonizes and synthesizes the metaphysics and epistemologies of
Augustine and Aristotle, but does not develop into an epistemology of
justified knowledge, which has been a hallmark of modern thought.191 For
Aquinas, epistemology takes place within the context of a set of theological
presuppositions that are taken as given.192 The epistemology of modernity
seeks a vantage point outside of presuppositions and prejudice from which
epistemological claims can be justified.193 Thomism relies on a tradition
that gives meaning to Scripture, teases out its insights, and provides warrants
for believing in its conclusion. Kleutgen’s error is that “[he] instead treats
Aquinas as presenting a finished system whose indebtedness to earlier
writers is no more than an accidental feature of it.”194 Asking Thomism to
do the work of refuting Cartesian epistemology distorts the nuanced
synthesis of Thomism by “opening up a kind of epistemological question
for which there is no place in Aquinas’s scheme of thought.”195 According
to MacIntyre, this led to a distortion in his thought that developed into a
variety of anti-modern Leonine Thomisms, which MacIntyre attributes to

189. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 39 (1991) (relating that Aquinas was a preeminent
philosopher due to his ability to integrate Augustinianism and Aristotelianism, two quite different
traditions).
190. See id. at 41 (relating that Aquinas was a preeminent philosopher due to his ability to
integrate Augustinianism and Aristotelianism, two quite different traditions).
191. See id. at 33, 41 (asserting Aquinas integrated the traditions of Augustine and Aristotle, but
relating also that the philosophical tradition of Aquinas is at odds with modern thought, which may be
obtained by an enquirer learning how to make themselves an apprentice to a craft of philosophical
enquiry to advance toward a knowledge of human good).
192. See id. at 37 (stating the idea of being is a given founded within the context of the action
of God, and God presenting Himself to the mind).
193. See id. at 34 (discussing the fact that “[t]he standards of achievement within any craft are
justified historically.”).
194. Id. at 38.
195. Id. at 38–39.
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adopting Suarez’s misreading of Aquinas.196 Thus, MacIntyre argues,
Kleutgen created the conditions that led to a fracturing of Thomism into a
plurality of different responses to modernity.197
c. The Apodicticity of Non-intentionality in Christian
Neo-Platonism
Given MacIntyre’s critique of Neo-Scholasticism, it is significant here to
consider the relation significance of Augustinian thought for the medieval
conception of self-evidence that Finnis adopts. Does the understanding of
apodicticity draw from Augustine’s forgotten metaphysics of perception?
The proper understanding of the relation between Augustinian thought and
Thomist thought has been a source of great controversy.198 In the early
20th century, the debate led to substantial hostility between Réginald
Georgiou-Lagrange and the neo-Augustinians whom he pejoratively
deemed la nouvelle theologie.199 Their members included Henri de Lubac,
196. See id. (stating that Kleutgen’s misidentification of Aquinas’s central positions with Suarez’s
led to a development of new Thomisms).
197. Id.
198. Lagrange’s philosophy centered on protecting realist metaphysics as the foundation for
Scholasticism. See AIDAN NICHOLS, REASON WITH PIETY: GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE IN THE SERVICE
OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT 12 (2008) (“The capacity of mind in its first opening co reality co capture by
a fundamental appreciation the intelligible content of the sensuous realm Garrigou terms approvingly
‘realist conceptualism’, or, in another phrase, ‘empirical rationalism’.”). Aidan Nichols describes the
argument in Lagrange’s 1909 book, The Common Sense: The Philosophy of Being and the Dogmatic Formulations:
Every judgment, after all, contains in some form the word “is”: joining subject and predicate; the
copula is necessary in any statement, though this may have to be pointed up by paraphrase. ‘This
man walks’ means ‘This man is walking’: what is designated by subject and predicate, the walking
man, is in reality one and the same being, whether actual, as in straight reportage, or possible, as
in literary fiction. Moreover, in all argumentation that is truth-attaining, whether a priori as in a
syllogism or a posteriori by inference from effects, we are dealing once again, with the raison d’etre
of something—which can be an extrinsic ‘reason for being’, as well as an intrinsic one: a railway
engine certainly has the latter, thanks to its construction, but it also has the former in, for example,
the mind of a minister of transport who commissioned its production. Etre, ‘being’ is, Garrigou
concludes, ‘the objective light of intelligence, the principle of universal intelligibility’.
Id.
199. In particular, Lagrange resisted the work of Henri de Lubac, who argued against the
nature/grace dialectic that had emerged in some forms of Neo-Scholastic thought. See D. Stephen
Long, Knowing God, in T&T CLARK COMPANION TO HENRI DE LUBAC 269, 275 (Jordan Hillebert, ed.,
2017) (stating that Lagrange singled out de Lubac in his 1947 criticism of modernism, titled La nouvelle
theologie ou va-t-elle?); see also KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT., supra note 99, at 74 (describing de Lubac’s
central thesis in his work Surnaturel). De Lubac believed that there is a natural desire for truth that
can be fulfilled only by the apprehension of God. KERR, AFTER AQUINAS, supra note 98, at 136. As
Kerr explains, this view was strongly rejected by the Thomists:
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Hans urs von Balthasar, and Joseph Ratzinger, who would become Pope
Benedict XVI.200 The theologians of la nouvelle theologie argued that
Thomists since the Reformation did not adequately appreciate the role of
Augustinian aspects of Aquinas’s thought.201 They claimed that since
Cajetan, Thomists had misunderstood the careful balance of faith and
reason that had been achieved by the early Church and preserved in the
authentic thought of Aquinas.202 They were particularly critical of the neoScholastic philosophers for having succumbed to modernizing forces that
further distorted the harmonies between faith and reason worked out by the
early Church. The dispute included a disagreement over the concept of
intentio, which was used with a philosophical and theological meaning much
earlier than the medieval period.203 Brentano acknowledged that he drew
from ancient, not only scholastic, sources in his study of the philosophical
problem of intentionality.204
Dominic O’Meara and Richard Sorabji have argued that Christian
Platonists were, in fact, aware of and made theological use of the notion of
intentio, even if they lacked a specific concept.205 Sorabji explained, “there

Many Thomists regarded this as an exorbitant claim. For one thing, they rejected de Lubac’s
ascribing their interpretation of the texts in question to blind acceptance of a misinterpretation
introduced by Cajetan. According to de Lubac, Cajetan assumed that Thomas was an Aristotelian,
working with a definition of nature from Aristotle’s Physics, which effectively turned human nature
into a reality essentially closed in on itself, with its own intrinsic powers, desires and goals. Out
of fear of the supposed Reformation doctrine of the depravity of human nature, such theologians
as Cajetan opened the way for post-Reformation Catholicism to insist so much on the value of
nature that they ended with a two-storey model of nature and grace, juxtaposing the two, as it
were, treating grace in relation to nature as essentially extrinsic and adventitious.
Id. Lagrange successfully argued that de Lubac’s work should be declared to be heterodoxy, and for a
period the Church suppressed it. See Long, supra at 275 (stating that de Lubac’s work was called into
question and deemed a heterodox). But, during the Second Vatican Council, the work of la nouvelle
theologie played an important role and gained prominence in the Church. KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT.,
supra note 99, at 76–77.
200. Long, supra note 199, at 275; KERR, TWENTIETH-CENT., supra note 99, at 191–92, 201.
201. KERR, AFTER AQUINAS, supra note 98, at 137.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunket, in REALISM AND THE
BACKGROUND OF PHENOMENOLOGY 42 (Roderick M. Chisholm ed., D.B. Terrell trans., 1960)
(drawing on older works while discussing the phenomena).
205. Dominic J. O’Meara, Intentional Objects in Later Neoplatonism, in ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL
THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY 115, 115 (Dominik Perler ed., 2001); Richard Sorabji, Why the
NeoPlatonists Did not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection, in ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF
INTENTIONALITY 105, 106 (Dominik Perler ed., 2001).
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are two kinds of thought in Neoplatonism[,]” there is a discursive form of
reasoning (dianoia, logos) which refers to “the step by step reasoning which
considers propositions.”206 And there is intellect (nous), which refers to
“the steady and even timeless understanding in which discursive thought
ideally terminates.”207 In the discursive form of reasoning, according to
O’Meara, internal (mental) objects (intention) represent transcendent
objects in discursive thinking.208 He writes: “[i]f the objects of discursive
thought are prior to it and independent of it, it thinks them all the same in
a way corresponding to its nature, as concepts.”209 Sorabji shows that the
form of thought identified as nous was not intentional, in the sense of making
use of mental objects.210 Taking Plotinus as the exemplar, Sorabji argues
that he was a metaphysical realist who viewed the objects of the intellect as
existing prior to and independent of the intellect and possessing a greater
actuality than the intellect.211 He writes: “Plotinus’ intelligibles are not
thought-dependent. Sometimes they are treated as identical with the
intellect, sometimes as prior. None of this draws attention to ‘aboutness’ or
intentional objects. The priority implies instead a realism about
intelligibles.”212 The awareness of intelligibles—the transcendent forms—is
not about any particular object. This seems to have been an outcome of the
metaphysics of Neo-Platonism. Following this approach, Augustine
recognized both intentional and non-intentional forms of consciousness.
Similarly, Victor Caston has noted that Augustine’s thought played a
transitional role between ancient and medieval traditions, drawing from
Aristotle in part, but also rejecting other aspects of Aristotelian thought.213
Caston notes that, with respect to the perception of the normal objects of
cognition, Augustine:
[M]akes intentio the centerpiece of his analysis of cognition in De trinitate—every
act of vision, memory, and thought is said to involve intentio as an essential
element. The theory accounts for content by appealing to this intentio, together
with forms or species that are replicated at each successive states of cognition.
These views, moreover, stem from a critical engagement with Greek views on
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Sorabji, supra note 205, at 106.
Id.
O’Meara, supra note 205, at 115.
Id. at 124.
Sorabji, supra note 205, at 106.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Caston, supra note 109, at 34.
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cognition: while rejecting key species aspects of Aristotelian and Stoic
theories, Augustine also incorporates elements from each, to produce an
innovate synthesis.214

A critical dimension to Augustinian thought has to do with his Platonism as
it was expressed in his conception of the imagio dei (divine image).215
Catholic thought has traditionally located the imagio dei in mystical
experiences of the divine image that are not intentional, in the sense of
reducing the experience of divine mystery to some apprehension that can
be expressed in a conception.216 The Augustinian theologians tended to
view this mystical experience as dwelling within all persons as the imagio dei,
thus they claimed that the awareness of the divine mystery that lies within
all persons is an irrefutable witness to the moral meaning of human
existence and the fundamental dignity of all persons.217 Christian moral
214. Id. at 33–34. For a discussion on the imagio dei and human dignity, see CLAUDIA WELZ,
HUMANITY IN GOD’S IMAGE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION 30 (2016) (“One of the most
influential accounts in Augustine’s idea that the divine Trinity is reflected in the mental faculties of the
human being—namely, in memory (memoria), intellect, (intellectus) and will (voluntas).”); see also C. Scott
Pryor, Article, Looking for Bedrock: Accounting for Human Rights in Classical Liberalism, Modern Secularism,
and the Christian Tradition, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 612 (2011) (analyzing human rights beginning in
the late-eighteenth century).
215. Caston, supra note 109, at 34.
216. The Christian Neo-Platonists were involved with a common intertextual project that reads
two very different texts in a single hermeneutic horizon. The texts were Book 7 of Plato’s Republic,
which contains the allegory of the philosopher’s assent from the cave, and the story in the book of
Exodus in which Moses encounters God as a burning bush on Mount Sinai. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
194–95 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968); Exodus 3:13–14. The early Christian Neo-Platonic theologians
sought to bring these two sources together. According to Denys Turner: “[t]he effect of their doing
so was a seismic shock which was still registering tremors twelve hundred years later . . . .” DENYS
TURNER, THE DARKNESS OF GOD: NEGATIVITY IN CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM 11 (1999). Though it
rumbles no more, today its ancient movements form features of the intellectual landscape that are not
difficult to detect. See id. at 12 (“what we perceive is the fixed metaphoric topography into which the
landscape has settled.”).
217. Christians believe that God is the source and sustainer of all Being. Augustine affirmed in
his reading of Exodus 3:13–14, the passage of scripture in which God reveals God’s name to Moses,
that God is the God of Being. Id. In the Latin of the Vulgate, God’s name was rendered “Ergo sum qui
sum [I am who am].” Id. at 3:14. Augustine interpreted this to mean that the Christian God is revealed
in this verse to be the God who creates and sustains all that is. In reaching this interpretation,
Augustinian Neo-Platonism was also influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius, who combined the
epistemological interests of Plato with the theological concerns of Exodus. TURNER, supra note 216,
at 13. Denys retells the Exodus narrative of Moses’s encounter with God on Mount Sinai using “a
pastiche of both the Exodus narrative and Platonic imagery” of Plato’s allegory of the cave. Id. at 14.
Both narratives contain a metaphorical assent toward a blinding light, so intense as “to cause pain,
distress and darkness: a darkness of knowledge deeper than any which is the darkness of ignorance.”
Id. at 17. It is a darkness that comes not from the absence of light, but from its excess—from its
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philosophy has typically been rooted in the theological commitment to the
intrinsic moral worth of individuals as bearers of the imago dei, a commitment
that is not reducible to a concept or proposition. This is because it draws
meaning from lived experiences that are non-intentional, meaning that they
arise from the apprehension of the divine that is not discursive.
The influence of Neo-Platonism among early Christians is particularly
significant here because it transformed the conception of self-evidence. For
example, Augustine sought God within his own interior self-awareness. In
the Confessions, he explains that in his youth, he had been unable to find God
because he lived outside himself.218 He writes of his conversion that God
within had been beckoning him on, drawing Augustine within himself on an
intinerarium intus—but inward toward what?219 What was the experience of
the self in which the mystery of the divine was apprehended by Augustine?
According to Burnaby, what Augustine sought during his “crucial year in his
life when as a young ‘don’ at Milan he first read the ‘books of the Platonists’”
was nothing less than an encounter with God made possible by the NeoPlatonic metaphysics of participation.220 By concluding that God is
immutable and incorruptible, and that evil was a privation of being,
Augustine was led to find what was within himself that was also immutable

blinding brilliance: a “luminous darkness.” Id. at 18. And the return from the encounter with this
blinding brilliance is a return to a darkness which is transformed by the experience—“where there is
only incredulity and ridicule to be had from those who cannot credit the witness to anything more
real.” Id. And in this condition is the “pain of contemplating more than can be borne.” Id. Turner
argues that this darkness is the source of the apophatic tradition in Western medieval theology, which
brought a sharply focused metaphysical syntax and grammar to thinking about the mechanics of
perception and the metaphysical nature of the human. See id. at 11–12 (discussing the impact on
Western Christian linguistics). Since God is prior to any and all particular types of beings (indeed, since
God is prior to Being as such), God must have attributes that are outside of those that can be
experienced and understood by the persons who are simply beings in God’s creation. For this reason,
God is not fully knowable by human beings.
218. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 150 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961) [hereinafter
CONFESSIONS].
219. Id. at 151. In his work on the Trinity (de Trinitate), Augustine writes:
There is an uncreated Being who has made all other beings great and small, unquestionably
surpassing all that he has made, and so surpassing also the reasonable and spiritual being of which
we have been speaking, namely man, made in the image of his Creator. And the Being surpassing
all others is God.
AUGUSTINE, The Trinity, in AUGUSTINE: LATER WORKS 114 (John Burnaby ed., 1955) [hereinafter The
Trinity].
220. JOHN BURNABY, AMOR DEI: A STUDY OF RELIGION IN ST. AUGUSTINE 29 (2007).
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and incorruptible.221 Thus, Augustine’s inward turn is not to the modern
self, if we mean self-awareness.
The experience of the divine was therefore essential to the search for the
truth of moral meaning in the thought of Augustine.222 For Augustine,
when his mind turned inward, it found within itself the power to judge the
changeable beauty of bodies.223 In a critical passage in the Confessions,
Augustine writes:
For I wondered how it was that I could appreciate beauty and material things
on earth or in the heavens, and what it was that enabled me to make correct
decisions about things that are subject to change and to rule that one thing
ought to be like this, another like that. I wondered how it was that I was able
to judge them in this way, and I realized that above my own mind, which was
liable to change, there was the never changing true eternity of truth. So, step
by step, my thoughts moved on from the consideration of material things to
the soul, which perceives things through the senses of the body, and then to
the soul’s inner power, to which the bodily senses communicate external facts.
Beyond this, dumb animals cannot go. The next stage is the power of reason,
to which the facts communicated by the bodily senses are submitted for
judgment.224

This complex passage expresses a theme found in many places in his writing.
First, he wonders “how it was that I could appreciate beauty in material
things on earth or in the heavens,” and then he concludes that it is through
the eternal, which is “above my own mind.”225 This theme of a journey
into the self in order to find access to an apprehension of the divine is a
distinctive feature of Christian thought.226
221. The Trinity, supra note 219, at 157.
222. BURNABY, supra note 220, at 29.
223. CONFESSIONS, supra note 218, at 151.
224. Id. at 151.
225. Id.
226. Augustine’s journey inward does not end in skepticism or subjectivity as some interpreters
have viewed it. It ends with the ineffable Other, an awareness of the presence of God within the
human soul, and the human within God. The Trinity, supra note 219, at 23. And although God is known
“through a glass darkly,” God is rationally understood and mystically apprehended to be more actual
than anything else encountered in human experience just as the Forms are more real for Plato than the
flickering shadows of the Cave. Id. As John Rist puts it, “Where for Plato the dimly perceived existence
of Forms establishes objectivity, for Augustine the dimly perceived memory of God within supplies this
objectivity.” JOHN M. RIST, AUGUSTINE: ANCIENT THOUGHT BAPTIZED 88 (1994). Through
introspection lays the radical otherness of the divine Being in whom all beings are connected and
united. When Augustine argues, “For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived,”
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Nonetheless, Descartes did not want his thought to be understood as
continuing the Augustinian formulation of the Cogito.227 In fact, he viewed
his project as directly opposed to Augustine’s in fundamental aspects.228
Marion explains that while Descartes’s cogito was similar to Augustine’s,
Descartes wrote “he [St. Augustine] does not seem to me to make use of it
in the same way I do.”229 Descartes applies the cogito with different
emphasis and to different effect.230 Marion explains Descartes’ intentions
with this passage, taken from a letter by Descartes to Clovius, his friend and
supporter:
I do indeed find that he does use it to prove the certainty of our existence.
He goes on to show that there is a certain likeness of the Trinity in us, in that
we exist, we know that we exist, and we love the existence and the knowledge
we have. I, on the other hand, use the argument to show that this I that is
thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element.231

Marion argues that what is original in Descartes’ cogito is the belief that selfawareness establishes the existence of an immaterial substance that is also
the first principle of epistemology—the ground of knowledge.232
For Augustine, the “[c]ertainty [of the si fallor, sum (if I am mistaken, I
must exist)] refers the mind to a distant ground, far from setting it up as a
principle subsisting in itself,” as is the purpose of Descartes’ cogito ergo
sum.233 By viewing consciousness as an immaterial substance separate from
material bodies, Descartes was blinded to the beauty, mystery, and wonder

he is affirming his relation to and dependency on the Trinity. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 468
(Rev. Marcus Dods, M.A. trans., 1888).
227. JEAN-LUC MARION, ON DESCARTES’ METAPHYSICAL PRISM: THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE LIMITS OF ONTO-THEO-LOGY IN CARTESIAN THOUGHT 129 (Jeffrey L. Kosky trans., 1999).
228. Id. at 131.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 132.
232. Id.
233. Id. As an example, Marion quotes this passage:
I have no fear of the arguments of the Academics. They say, “Suppose you are mistaken?” I
reply, “If I am mistaken, I exist [si fallor, sum].” A non-existent being cannot be mistaken; therefore
I must exist, if I am mistaken [ac per hoc sum, si fallor]. Then since my being mistaken proves that
I exist, how can I be mistaken in thinking that I exist, seeing that my mistake establishes my
existence [quando certum me esse, si fallor]?
Id. at 129.
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that Augustine experienced in his inward journey.234 For Augustine, the si
fallor, sum was generative of a sense of apodicticity—the feeling that a
conclusion is necessary or self-evident.235 He expressed his conclusion as
self-evident, but his foundational intuition was not lacking in beauty,
mystery, or wonder.236 The wonderful extravagance of the experience, its
lushness, and its splendor, was in fact, the very source of its sense of
apodicticity.237 To have had the experience of the divine, as Augustine did,
left no doubt in the reality of God.238 For Descartes, the sense of
apodicticity associated with his version of the cogito was a result of the
univocal and persistent self-awareness of the “I” that thinks its own
existence.239 This sense of certainty dissolves the extravagant lushness of
Augustine’s interior experience in favor of conceptual clarity.240 By making
the cogito the first principle, Descartes’ philosophy became methodologically
blind to the extravagant sublimity that Augustine associated with the imagio
dei that is experienced as the source of human dignity.241 This aspect of the
cogito formed the assault on the foundations of Christian anthropology—
both the first faculty of the Scholastic philosophers and the foundational
experience of the divine underwrote the Christian Neo-Platonists, which
neo-Thomism brought to scrutiny in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
2.

The Logic of the Schoolmen
a.

Aristotelian Origins

During the medieval period, the Aristotelian texts were reintroduced to
Western Europe and had a strong influence on the universities. The
recovery of Aristotelian logic focused on a collection of texts known as the
Organon, in which Aristotle relates logic to metaphysics.242 The first text
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id.
William Kneale & Martha Kneale explain:

When Aristotle’s writings were collected by his pupils after his death in 322 B.C., a number of his
treatises on reasoning were grouped together, and the collection came to be called the Organon, or
instrument of science. The word ‘logic’ did not acquire its modern sense until some 500 years
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within this collection—de Categorea (The Categories)—contains the following
description of substance:
Substance in the most literal and primary and common sense of the term is
that which is neither predicated of a subject nor exists in a subject, as for
example, the individual man or horse. Those things are called secondary
substances to which, as species, belong the things called substances in the
primary sense and also the genera of these species. For example, the
individual man belongs to the species man, and the genus of the species is
animal. These, then, are called secondary substances, as for example both
man and animal.243

The standard interpretation of this passage holds that Aristotle is “dealing
with things and not with words.”244 To understand the significance of this
interpretation of the Organon, as being concerned with real objects, requires
some understanding of how Aristotle believed that the mind comes to know
objects and hold mental representations (esse intentionale) of them.245 He
draws a close metaphysical connect between the essence of things perceived
and the words that express that essence.246
In De Interpretatione (The Interpretations),247 Aristotle lays out his principles
for general statements. He is concerned with the relations among
combinations of universal and particular statements.248 General statements
include: universal, like “all men are white,” and “no men are white;” and
particulars, like “some men are white” and “some men are not white.”249
Aristotle is not concerned here with cataloging the basic rules of all logical
propositions, which would be the focus in the twentieth century, but only
of the relations among these general statements.250 The other texts are the
Analytica Priora (Prior Analytics)251 and the Topica (Topics).252 These texts
later, when it was used by Alexander of Aphrodisias, but the scope of the study later called logic
was determined by the content of the Organon.
WILLIAM KNEALE & MARTHA KNEALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 23 (1962).
243. Id. at 26 (quoting ARISTOTLE, Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione. Ed. L. Minio).
244. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 27–28.
246. Id. at 27.
247. Id. at 55.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 56.
250. Id. at 55.
251. Id. at 23–24.
252. Id.
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continue and develop the analysis proposed in the Interpretations. The Prior
Analytics introduces the concept of syllogism, and the Topics describes the
dialectic method.253 The final text in the Organon collection is the De
Sophisticis Elenchis (Sophistical Refutations),254 which deals with several specific
logical fallacies.
b.

Medieval Logicians

The medieval scholastic philosophers interpreted the texts of the Organon
in accordance with the whole of Aristotelian philosophy. One of the first
texts to take account of the whole of the Organon was John of Salisbury’s
Metalogicon (1159).255 During the early medieval period, logic was a subject
of much theological concern and debate. Two principle texts existed. One
was by William of Shyreswood (the Introductiones in Logicam, also known as
the Summulae)256 and the other by Peter of Spain (who became Pope John
XXI), the Summulae Logicales.257 Their works were manuals of logic. The
one written by Peter of Spain became a standard textbook in logic.258
Kneale & Kneale note it was “still in use as late as the beginning of the
seventeenth century, by which time there had been no less that 166 printed
editions.”259 The differences between the two text traditions focused on
the truth of conditional statements. The concept of probability did not yet
exist.260 The debates centered on the necessity of conditional statements.
Peter of Spain (John XXI) wrote in his manual, “[F]or the truth of a
conditional…, it is required, quod antecedens non possit esse verum sine
consequente.”261 This translates to: the antecedent cannot be true without the

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 234.
See id. at 234 (explaining the importance of Peter of Spain’s writings to future scholars).
Id.
One history of the concept of probability notes:

In 1865 Isaac Todhunter published A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability from the Time of
Pascal to that of Laplace. It remains an authoritative survey of nearly all work between 1654 and
1812. Its title is exactly right. There was hardly any history to record before Pascal, while after
Laplace probability was so well understood that a page-by-page account of published work on
the subject became almost impossible.
IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 1 (1993).
261. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 235.
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consequent.262 The question concerned whether the truth of a claim about
an antecedent condition depended on the truth of the consequential
outcome. In the later medieval period, these controversies would develop
into debates about modalities.263 Albert the Great’s commentary on
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics draws from William of Shyreswood’s manual and
Peter Abelard’s Logica Ingredientibus.264 The obscure tract, De Modalibus,265
contains Thomas Aquinas’ thoughts on this subject. In Summa Contra
Gentiles, he is concerned with the implications that God’s foreknowledge will
have no logic.266 Since God is eternal and has foreknowledge of events,
this question arises: Is the truth of contingent propositions determined by
the consequences that are foreknown by God?267 The question was of
great interest among medieval logicians.268 The analysis of these questions
preceded from the assumption that there is a reality that is described by a
proposition.269 Grammar and syntax are not simply systems of symbolic
representation. The symbols correlate to concepts that are mental
representations (esse intentionale) of actual entities.270
c.

Finnis and the Logic of Propositio Per Se Nota

With this background in mind, a close examination of Finnis’ use of
Aquinas’ conception of self-evidence can be analyzed. For Aquinas, natural
law principles are propositio per se nota (self-evident).271 He suggests that they
are apodictic because they are immediately apprehended as logically
necessary.272 He writes: “They are not inferred from facts. They are not
inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature.”273 This
claim bears careful examination since it seems prima facie to conflict with
the metaphysical axiology of Catholic philosophy described above. Since
the logic of Aquinas’s propositio per se nota is not grounded in the same
262. Id.
263. Id. at 237.
264. Id. at 236.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 237.
267. See AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES: BOOK ONE: GOD 217–25 (Anton C. Pegis,
trans., Notre Dame Press ed. 1975) (discussing God’s infallible knowledge).
268. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 238.
269. Id. at 232.
270. Id. at 230–31.
271. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 35.
272. Id. at 36.
273. Id. at 33.
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ontological foundations as the self-evidence of modern logic, what is the
significance of this difference for Finnis’ theory? Self-evidence is not itself
a univocal concept since what counts as logically necessary evolved into
different conceptions. Understanding these conceptions is critical for the
Finnis reconstruction of natural law that needs to be given close
consideration.
What is the conception of self-evidence that Aquinas picks out with his
claim of propositio per se nota? Finnis writes:
Near the very beginning of the tradition of theorizing about natural right, we
find Aristotle quite explicit that ethics can only be usefully discussed with
experienced and mature people, and that age is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the required maturity. He does not explicitly ascribe selfevidence or indemonstrability or axiomatic status to any ethical or practical
principles, though he treats certain things as beyond question: for example,
that no one would wish to attain ‘happiness’ at the cost of losing his identity.
Aquinas, on the other hand, has a discussion on self-evidence, if we translate
propositio per se nota as ‘self-evident proposition’ . . . . Aquinas’s discussion
begins by pointing out that while some propositions are self-evident to
‘everyone’, since everyone understands their terms, other propositions are
self-evident only to ‘the wise’, since only the relatively wise (or learned)
understand what they mean. He gives two examples of the latter sort of selfevident propositions, from the field of speculative philosophy; one is that ‘a
human being is a rational being’, and the other is that ‘a disembodied spirit
does not occupy space’. He then proceeds to speak about the self-evident
pre-moral principles which he later calls communissima, without, unfortunately,
indicating which if any of them he thinks self-evident only to the relatively
wise. An example is, perhaps, the principle ‘to know about God is a good’.
For Aquinas denied that the existence of God is self-evident, even to the
relatively wise, in this life.274

In this passage, Finnis is introducing self-evident principles. He notes that
even some of these that are, in principle, self-evident may not be self-evident
to a person lacking wisdom.275 Finnis appears to understand self-evidence
in a similar way. To understand the truth of a propositio per se nota is simply
to have wisdom about what is good. An open question is, what is meant by
wise?

274. Id. at 31–32.
275. Id. at 32.
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Finnis’ analysis of propositio per se nota makes understanding the conception
of the wise a center inquiry of the Basic Goods.276 Aquinas describes
wisdom in the Summa Contra Gentiles I, 2:
And so, in the name of the divine Mercy, I have the confidence to embark
upon the work of a wise man, even though this may surpass my powers, and
I have set myself the task of making known, as far as my limited powers will
allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors
that are opposed to it. To use the words of Hilary: “I am aware that I owe
this to God as the chief duty of my life, that my every word and sense may
speak of Him”.277

This passage suggests that Aquinas understands the “wise” to be that which
is in accordance with Truth, which is divine.278 The work of the wise is to
make that truth known. But what is truth? The reference to St. Hilary’s de
Trinitate suggests that Truth is not simply the self-evidence of mental clarity,
but an openness to the lived experience of mystery that Augustine asserted
in his si fallor, sum.279
This relation between Aquinas and Augustine on the concept of selfevidence is given some light by Matthew Lamb, who writes:
Thomas Aquinas articulates the Augustinian quest for understanding and
truth theoretically by attending to the two sets of operations of the mind as
understanding and judgment. The acts of judging occur in the intelligible light
of active intelligence or agent intellect. This light is, as he states (linking
Aristotle and Augustine), a created participation in the Divine Eternal Light.
Aquinas grasped the essential point of Augustine’s intellectual conversion.
Intelligence in act does not rest in understanding, thinking, conceiving – the
first act of the mind – but in understanding correctly, in knowing, in reaching
correct judgments and truth. Aquinas transposed into a metaphysical wisdom
the intellectual ascent of discovering the nature of the mind in Augustine and
the other Fathers. With them he distinguishes between the orientation of the
mind toward the sensible and imaginable (what he terms the “ratio inferior” or
attention of the mind toward the data of sense) and the orientation of the
mind to know itself, and through understanding its own spiritual nature,
276. Id.
277. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES: BOOK ONE: GOD 62 (Anton C.
Pegis trans., Notre Dame Press ed. 1975) (quoting St. Hilary, de Trinitate I, 37).
278. Id. at 62.
279. See id. at 82 (discussing the existence of God as “something than which a greater cannot
be thought . . .”).
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beings like angels and God that are purely spiritual (the “ratio superior” or
attention of the mind to itself and spiritual realities). I call these “orientations”
since Aquinas is clear that they are not separate faculties but rather different
objects intended by the mind. By attending to its own operations of knowing
and loving, Aquinas grasps the central importance of this immaterial image of
God as the best analogue to understand the central mystery of the Triune
God.280

If this analysis is correct, the conception of self-evidence as propositio per se
nota cannot serve the purpose that Finnis has in mind for self-evidence of
Basic Goods because the good of the human as bearer of the imagio dei is
apodictic only where the lush presence of God is felt. Further, this sense of
apodictic is fundamentally inconsistent with the separation of fact and value.
If Aquinas accepted the dual nature of awareness (intentional and nonintentional), the claim that there are principles of practical reason that are
propositio per se nota rests on an apprehension that such principles are
apodictic as intentional and non-intentional perceptions.
B. David Hilbert and Self-Evidence
The other conception of self-evidence that Finnis looks to is that of
modern philosophy. He specifically mentions David Hilbert and Oswald
Veblen.281 Modern philosophy’s encounter with logic was closely tied to
developments in mathematics, which was given shape in the seventeenth
century with René Descartes, Isaac Newton, Gottfried Leibniz, and Pierre
de Fermat.282 They collectively developed the new mathematics of calculus
and applied it to the study of the mechanics of gravitation and motion.
These innovations had consequences for philosophy and logic that shape
the understanding of realism today. Nonetheless, Finnis does not
acknowledge the differences between medieval logic and modern logic in
his conceptualizations of self-evidence. As has been described above,
medieval logic presupposes ontological realism, but the modern logics do
not. Some consideration of how this critical change occurred is needed
because the issue that arose in classical logic was substantial, and the crisis
that developed led to the abandonment of classical realism and the adoption
280. Matthew L. Lamb, Wisdom, Faith and Reason in St. Thomas Aquinas: The Challenge of John Paul
II’s Fides et Ratio, 1 FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM: J. THEOLOGY, PHIL., & HIST. 1, 9–10 (2001),
https://www.academia.edu/33230483/Wisdom_Faith_and_Reason_in_Aquinas (emphasis added).
281. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 67.
282. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 73.
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of the abstract symbolic logic that is dominant today. The consequences
for the conception of self-evidence were substantial in ways that are directly
relevant to Finnis’ hope to ground the truth of the Basic Goods on the
apodicticity of logical self-evidence.
1.

The Challenges to Euclidean Geometry

In ancient and early modern philosophy, Euclid’s Elements of Geometry was
understood to be an inviolate foundation of knowledge. Scholastic
philosophy confirmed the rationality of God by expressing the order of
Creation.283 They took Euclid as confirming that there are claims that are
self-evident in the sense that to understand the claim is to understand its
apodicticity. Early modern rationalism generally held that such self-evident
claims could be the grounds for all claims to knowledge.284 Nonetheless,
in the late nineteenth century, challenges to the foundations of Euclidean
geometry formed in many quarters.285 In particular, the development of
mathematical analysis of the geometry of curved spaces showed that
Euclid’s geometry was, in some regards, incomplete or inconsistent.286 A
new ground for understanding the foundational principles of geometry was
needed.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dominated by two
philosophical styles: rationalism and empiricism.287 Descartes was a
rationalist.288 His belief that the foundations of knowledge could be
determined through reason was endorsed by Baruch Spinoza, Leibniz, and
many others who were the heirs to Platonism’s conception of rational forms
that exist apart from the world in which they participate.289 Generally
speaking, rationalists identified the foundational concepts of mathematics
as knowable through reason alone (a priori). The other school, empiricism,
was exemplified by George Berkeley, whose famous enquiry—“[C]an we
not think of trees existing . . . when no one perceives them?”—was intended

283. See KENNY, AQUINAS, supra note 137, at 57 (explaining “[i]n the ancient world and in the
Middle Ages Euclidean geometry appeared to be the paradigm of ordered knowledge, a paradigm to
which, in due course, all scientific disciplines could be made to conform.”).
284. Id.
285. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 381–82.
286. Id. at 379–80.
287. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 74.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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to question perception and knowledge.290 Empiricism was also endorsed
by David Hume, John Locke, Thomas Reid, and John Stuart Mill.291 Only
experience, they believed, could provide the groundwork of knowledge.292
The English favored empiricism, which was an appeal to experience
interpreted by an individual.293 The philosophers in this group include
George Berkeley, John Locke, and David Hume.294 A common trope for
them is that knowledge is simply the imprint of experience.295 As John
Locke imagines, human beings are born as pure potential, a blank slate
(tabula rasa) on to which experience is written.296 Experience is the source
of all-knowing, and also the principle by which human beings are
individuated.297 John Stuart Mill made a similar claim.298 Empiricists took
different positions, Hume—for example—believed that mathematics was
purely the study of relations between concepts.299 Geometry, however, is
empirical because it is about the relation between objects in space.300
This was the setting for Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, which sought to
reconcile the two. Kant introduced the vocabulary of synthetic/analytic and
a priori/a posteriori in his attempt to understand mathematics and
geometry.301 Kant developed a general description of propositions of the
form: “All S are P.”302 If (S) contains (P), then the proposition is
analytic.303 “For example, ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ [men] is analytic”
because the concept “bachelor” contains the concept of “unmarried”

290. GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE 34 (1881).
291. See id. at 74, 91–102 (discussing empiricism and Mill).
292. See id. (stating empiricists use experiences from the five senses as a base for knowledge).
293. See id. (listing English empiricists whom believed “[t]he only access to the universe is
through our eyes, ears, and so on.”).
294. Id.
295. See id. (asserting empiricists believe “anything we know about the world must ultimately
come from neutral and dispassionate observation.”).
296. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 18
(2002).
297. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 91–92 (stating human perception must conform to empirical
knowledge).
298. See id. at 100 (recognizing Mills as claiming experience is the base of discovery).
299. See id. at 75 (discussing Hume’s claim that all mathematics “concern (mere) relations among
ideas . . . ”).
300. See id. at 94 (discussing Euclidean geometry).
301. Id. at 77.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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men.304 Synthetic propositions are those that are not analytic, meaning
where P is not contained in S.305 “All presidents are honest” is a synthetic
proposition because the concept of president does not contain the concept
of honesty.306 For Kant, almost all mathematical propositions are synthetic
a priori.307 Kant’s account of mathematics came under increasing attack,
particularly as the development of non-Euclidean geometry raised questions
that Kantians could not answer.308 This led to an epistemological crisis,
which extended even to arithmetic.309
2.

Responses to the Crisis

How might it be possible to prove that 2+2=4? It was in attempting to
resolve this issue that Frege laid the foundation for the analytic approach to
philosophy and jurisprudence.310 Understanding Frege’s work on the
foundations of arithmetic is significant for understanding why analytic
jurisprudence is characterized by the abstractions that Tamanaha finds to be
inadequate. And, it challenges Mills to respond in his theory to the
epistemological concerns that drove Frege to take his position.311 Frege
argued that arithmetic is analytic, but by analytic, he meant something
somewhat different from Kant.312 For Frege, numbers are defined by a
concept and all instantiations of the concept (this is called the “extension”
of the concept).313 For example, the concept of 2 refers to all instances of
two. He expresses this formally: “The number which belongs to the concept
F is the extension of the concept equinumerous with the concept F.”314
304. Id. The understanding of concepts will not be explored here, other than to note concepts
are modular or aggregates of other concepts, since one can contain another. See also H. J. PATON, THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 122 (1971) (giving an
example of a synthetic proposition).
305. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 77; See also PATON, supra note 304, at 122 (analyzing Kant’s view
that synthetic propositions are not analytic).
306. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 77 (arguing that if the predicate concept is not contained in
the subject concept then proposition is synthetic). A special set of propositions are synthetic, and yet
their truth is known a priori through intuition (which is an immediate, singular insight), and some of
these are synthetic a priori. See id. at 80 (explaining synthetic propositions are known through intuition
rather than sensory experience).
307. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 80
308. See id. at 83 (analyzing critics of Kant’s account of mathematics).
309. See id. at 75 (noting Hume claimed arithmetic is not empirical).
310. See id. at 96 (discussing Frege’s disagreement with Mill).
311. Id. at 97.
312. Id. at 108.
313. See id. at 112 (explaining Frege’s “extension” concept).
314. Id.
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This is an analytic definition of a number in as much as the concept F
identifies and is equinumerous with the instances of F.315
In a controversial argument, Michael Dummett observes that in
paragraph 62 of the Foundations of Arithmetic, where Frege investigated the
question “How are numbers given to us?” he immediately reformulates this
question in his own terms by speaking of the meaning (Bedeutung) of
sentences containing numbers. Dummett argues that this is one of the
earliest formulations of the linguistic turn in philosophy.316 As he puts it,
the linguistic turn holds that “[a]n epistemological enquiry (behind which
lies an ontological one) is to be answered by a linguistic investigation.”317
For Frege, concepts are not objective in the sense that they are solely
external events, nor are they objects fully grasped by mental acts.
Nevertheless, they are not solely subjective either, since they are never mine
alone.318 Concepts are “timeless and immutable entities which do not
depend for their existence on being grasped or expressed.”319 Here, Frege
appears to assert that linguistic context gives the thought of numbers their
meaning. That is to say, the thought of a number would have no meaning
outside of the context of a language in which numbers have sense. He
generalizes this thesis to state that it is only in the context of a sentence that
any word has sense by corresponding to the thought to which it refers.320
According to Dummett, this argument by Frege, which began with the
substitution of Kant’s subjective psychological question (“How are numbers
given to us?”) with a linguistic one (“How do sentences containing numbers
have meaning”?) began the “linguistic turn” in philosophy whereby analytic
philosophy became focused on the analysis of abstract concepts.321 Frege’s
315. See id. (comparing the definition of a number to the concept of an object).
316. Shapiro notes, however:
Dummett locates the ‘linguistic turn’ with Frege, but this is controversial. Although Frege was
clearly a pivotal figure in the eventual development of the semantic tradition, he did not hold that
all necessary truth is truth by definition. Recall that, for Frege, the truths of geometry are synthetic,
a priori . . . and so not true by definition. For Frege, analytic truths are derivable from ‘general
logical laws and definitions’. Thus, the status of Fregean analytic truths turns on the nature of
‘general logical laws,’ but Frege did not say much about these . . . .
Id. at 125 n.13.
317. MICHAEL DUMMETT, ORIGINS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 (1993).
318. Id. at 22–23.
319. Id. at 23.
320. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 112 (“The extension of a concept is the class of all objects
that the concept applies to.”).
321. See Dummett, supra note 318, at 5 (noting Frege’s argument began a linguistic turn).
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approach embodies two distinguishing features of analytic philosophy: (i) A
philosophical account of thought can be obtained through the analysis of
language; and (ii) such an account can only be achieved through an account
of language. For Frege and for the later analytic philosophers, meaning
exists only in language.322
Hilbert and Veblen also attempted to respond to this crisis.323 Veblen
developed what he called “Projection Geometry,” which is a non-realist
approach to geometry but found few followers.324 Hilbert was far more
influential than Veblen.325 He hoped to find a new foundation for
geometry that does not presuppose the existence of self-evident
foundations.326 Both Hilbert and Veblen were shaped by controversies of
the late nineteenth century when the field of geometry experienced a
prolonged period of crisis.327 During this period, the logical foundations
of geometry came under intense scrutiny that led to the replacement of
classical logic by modern logic, which presented new opportunities to
consider the foundations of mathematical knowledge.328 In the late
nineteenth century, this examination of foundations was given impetus
when non-Euclidean geometries were discovered, raising questions about
the foundations of the traditional Euclidean principles.329 The immediate
issues concerned reconceiving general principles of geometry that would be
applicable to all forms, Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Fashioning such
principles was what they sought to accomplish.330
322. Frege’s approach to meaning and reference did not immediately transform philosophy, let
alone legal philosophy. It marks the beginning of an approach that evolved, influenced by many
sources, into a generalized approach to philosophy which focuses on the grammar and syntax of
ordinary language. See ROLAND HAUSSER, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS:
HUMAN-COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 392 (2d ed. 2001) (analyzing
Frege’s approach to meaning and natural language).
323. See generally JOAN ROSELLO, HILBERT, GÖTTINGEN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MODERN MATHEMATICS 96 (2019) (explaining Hilbert’s approach to mathematics); OSWALD
VEBLEN & JOHN W. YOUNG, PROJECTION GEOMETRY (1910) (articulating Velblen’s approach to
mathematics).
324. VEBLEN & YOUNG, supra note 324 (containing Velblen’s approach to geometry).
325. ROSELLO, supra note 324, at 96 (2019).
326. See SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 151 (recognizing “Hilbert’s work in geometry . . . represents
the culmination of these foundational developments.”).
327. Id. at 158.
328. See id. at 151 (analyzing Hilbert’s work as a new foundation for geometry).
329. See id. (arguing the late nineteenth century “marked an end to an essential role for intuition
in geometry.”).
330. See id. at 153 (highlighting Hilbert’s method to reconceive general principles of geometry
and apply them to all forms).
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Hilbert writes on geometry and generally accepted practices in the natural
sciences, both of which he believes make use of the concept of selfevidence.331 In Grundlagen der Geometrie (Foundations of Geometry) published
in 1899,332 Hilbert attempted to found geometry on the basis of an entirely
new conception and set of axioms that he believed could unite mathematics,
logic, and set theory.333 He “rebuilt [mathematics] by laying down
principles which are sufficient to support the generally accepted
doctrine….”334 Central to his new system was the belief that axioms did
not represent real forms.335 That is to say, the foundational definitions of
geometry reflect idealized forms with no actual existence. In a useful essay,
Stewart Shapiro explains that Hilbert represents the culmination of a trend
to view the “axioms of a given branch of mathematics serve as an implicit
definition of the primitive terms of the branch.”336 Shapiro neatly
summarizes Hilbert’s view on this point:
We think of . . . points, straight lines, and planes as having certain mutual
relations, which we indicate by means of such words as “are situated”,
“between”, “parallel”, and “congruent”, “continuous”, etc. The complete and
exact description of these relations follows as a consequence of the axioms of
geometry.337

This assumption stands in sharp contrast to Euclid, who believed that the
formal definitions of geometry correspond to actual Platonic forms.338 Yet,
for Hilbert, they are merely the grammar and syntax of geometric ideas.339
Thus, Hilbert believed that the work of the geometer is to discern the logical
structures of the relations among foundational definitions.340 This
reformulation of geometry “[did] not give rise to contradiction.”341
Hilbert’s axioms result in a closed system of propositions that may not
331. David Hilbert, On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic, in FROM FREGE TO GÖDEL 129,
129 (Jean Vam Heijenoort ed., 2000).
332. DAVID HILBERT, GRUNDLAGEN DER GEOMETRIE (Tuebner, First ed. 1899).
333. Id. at 131.
334. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 682.
335. See id. at 685 (noting Hilbert sees axioms as undefined).
336. Stewart Shapiro, We Hold These Truths to be Self-Evident: But What do we Mean by That?, 2 REV.
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 175, 175–76 (2009).
337. Id. at 176.
338. See id. at 176–77 (discussing Euclideans and Hilbert disagree on the assumption of axioms).
339. See id. at 177.
340. Id.
341. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 682.
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contradict one another. Thus, Euclidian geometry and non-Euclidean
geometry are demonstrably coherent but not logically necessary. The
propositions of the Euclidian system cannot be translated to non-Euclidian
geometry. Hilbert believed this process of axiomatization could be
generalized to provide foundations for all areas of mathematics.
Hilbert, like Frege, attempted to construct geometry based on an entirely
new conception and set of axioms he believed could unite mathematics,
logic, and set theory.342 Hilbert rebuilt mathematics “by laying down
principles which are sufficient to support the generally accepted
doctrine . . . .”343 Central to his new system was the belief that axioms did
not represent real forms. The foundational definitions of geometry did not
reflect existing forms, as Euclid believed, but merely the grammar and
syntax of geometric ideas. The work of the geometer is to discern the logical
structures of the relations among foundational concepts. The attempt to
create these axioms is known as the Hilbert program. 344
Within the Hilbert Program, formal axiomatization is understood to be
non-realist in a sense similar to the forms of modern logic described
above.345 The axioms are logical propositions that are viewed as symbolic
of logical relations, not representative of forms of Being.346 In this sense,
they are not “natural.” Significantly, the Hilbert Program does not make
use of the concept of self-evidence.347 One difference between Hilbert and
Frege’s projects was that Frege retained a realism he believed could yield
self-evident truths.348 Frege and Hilbert both sought to determine the
foundation of mathematics on axioms.349 Frege’s axioms were self-evident
basic principles, while Hilbert’s were definitions that are part of a coherent
logico-semantic system.350 Since the Hilbert Program did not endorse a
metaphysical realism, it did not look for self-evident principles in nature.351
342. Id. at 685.
343. Id. at 682.
344. See Richard Zach, Hilbert’s Program, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/hilbert-program/
[https://perma.cc/FT4MKWRE] (stating the Hilbert Program “calls for a formalization of all of mathematics in axiomatic form,
together with a proof that this axiomatization of mathematics is consistent.”).
345. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 687–88.
346. Zach, supra note 345.
347. See id. (utilizing the terms intuition or intuitive knowledge instead of self-evidence).
348. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 509.
349 Patricia Blanchette, The Frege-Hilbert Controversy, STAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-hilbert/ [https://perma.cc/D6TT-J8XZ].
350. Id.
351. Øystein Linnebo explains:
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Thus, Finnis’ reference to Hilbert is an equivocation, as clearly Hilbert, in
fact, completely rejected the classical ontological understanding of selfevident foundations and sought to found geometry on a new footing. His
thoughts on the foundations of geometry are, nonetheless, insightful for
understanding Finnis’ claim. The practical consequence of this difference
is illustrated with a brief example. Consider:
Aristotelian Syllogism352
First Premise: All men are mortal
Second Premise: Socrates is a man,
Conclusion: modus ponens—Therefore, Socrates is mortal
Propositional Calculus353
Formal premise: If “Socrates is a man,” then “Socrates is mortal”
Formal conclusion: modus ponens—P →Q, P
Predicate Calculus354
Premise 1: “If anything is a human, then it is mortal.”
Premise 2: “Socrates is a man.”
Conclusion: “Socrates is mortal.”
Formal premises: For all x, M(x)→H(x). H(S).
Intermediate step: universal instantiation: H(S)→M(S).
Formal conclusion: modus ponens—M(S)
In the Aristotelian system, the universal “men” names some element
“mortality” that is common to individual men.355 It is a real feature or trait
of men. In the Propositional Calculus, however, “men” is a set which
Following the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry, the link between geometry and the physical
space was abandoned for Hilbert’s more abstract approach, which regards geometry as the study
of any system of objects structured in some appropriate and loosely “spacelike” manner. An
analogous development took place in algebra, where theories of algebraic structures each as
groups, rings, and fields were formulated with the explicit aim of not having a particular
interpretation. The aim was instead to characterize important classes of structures that have
multiple realizations throughout mathematics and perhaps the physical world.
ØYSTEIN LINNEBO, PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 155 (2017).
352. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 375.
353. Id. at 362.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 375.
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includes all individual men.356 There is no ontological assumption about
the existence of mortality. In the predicate calculus, the intermediate step,
the universal instantiation (H(S)→M(S)) symbolizes this relation.357 The
predicate calculus is concerned primarily with logical form, and not with the
substance of the propositions. The non-generalizability of the Aristotelian
syllogism was observed in an early work by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “Mankind
is a class whose elements are men; but a library is not a class whose elements
are books, because books become parts of a library only by standing in
certain spatial relations to one another[—]while classes are independent of
the relations between their members.”358 This passage was part of a review
of a textbook on Aristotelian logic.359 Wittgenstein’s point is to argue that
Coffrey had become confused because he had attributed ontological status
to the terms of the predicate.360 This led to confusion, particularly in the
predication of classes. Symbolic logic seeks to avoid this confusion by not
relying on any ontological presupposition.
To summarize, Finnis uses two incompatible conceptions of selfevidence.361 One is that of Thomas Aquinas, who believed that some
claims are true because the truth speaks for itself (per se nota).362 In the
philosophical synthesis of the Schoolmen, this meant that the relationship
among beings (ens) that have actual existence (in actu) are transparent to the
faculties of human apprehension.363 This is due to the presupposition of a
realist view of logic that assumed the existence and knowledge of objects in
the world.364 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mathematical
logicians, like David Hilbert, rejected the realism of the Scholastic logicians
finding it to be naïve.365 They developed a modern symbolic logic that did
not need to presume an ontological status for the grammar and syntax of

356. Id. at 362.
357. Id.
358. RAY MONK, HOW TO READ WITTGENSTEIN 4 (2005) (quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Review: P. Coffey, The Science of Logic, 34 CAMBRIDGE REV. 351 (1913)).
359. Id. at 5.
360. Id. at 7–12.
361. See generally FINNIS, supra note 1 (discussing self-evidence and how it is perceived by
different philosophers).
362. Id. at 32–33.
363. BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE THEORY AND CONTEXT 67 (2012).
364. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 61–62.
365. KNEALE & KNEALE, supra note 242, at 683–84.
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propositions.366 Finnis sometimes looks to modern logic, even though it
rejects the ontological realism of Thomistic philosophy.367 Modern
symbolic logic is a science of the symbolic representations of abstract sets.
There is no ontological commitment whatsoever. Self-evidence, in the sense
used in modern symbolic logic, is simply a correlation of the elements of
sets.368 The claim of self-evidence is the type of proposition that Kant
called analytic, which is self-evidently true to anyone who knows the set in
that sense of the concept.369 That a bachelor is an unmarried man is selfevident to anyone who knows the concept “bachelor” and the phrase
“unmarried man.”370 Finnis equivocates between the premodern realist
ontology and the modern linguistic construction of logic.371 At times,
Finnis will refer to Aquinas’ conception of self-evidence as per se nota.
However, when he feels pressed to justify his concept of self-evidence, he
looks to David Hilbert and modern representational constructions of
logic.372
III. ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS AND THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA
Part I shows that the claim of self-evident basic principles of practical
reason are the foundation for the Finnis reconstruction of natural law.373
Part II shows that Finnis equivocates between two conceptions of selfevidence.374 One is that of Aquinas and the medieval Scholastic
philosophers (the Schoolmen), and the other is that of the modern
philosophy of logic, which views logical propositions as symbolic relations
instantiated in language. Taken together, the foregoing analysis in
Parts I and II suggest that Finnis’ reconstruction of the natural law is
founded on the horns of a dilemma.375 If he accepts Aquinas’ conception
of self-evidence, which is founded on a commitment to ontological realism,
then he appears to violate the separation of fact and value, which he believes
366. Edwin Mares, Propositional Function, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Jul. 20, 2011),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositional-function/#CatGra
[https://perma.cc/SH29FSNG].
367. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 67.
368. Id. at 23.
369. Id. at 32.
370. SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 77.
371. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 32–33.
372. Id. at 67–68.
373. See supra text and notes accompanying Part I.A.
374. See supra text and notes accompanying Part II.
375. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 25.
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must be accepted in any contemporary natural law theory. However, if he
accepts the relational view of self-evidence developed by twentieth-century
logicians, then the moral meaning of the Basic Goods cannot be maintained.
Self-evidence in the sense of linguistic correlation does not provide adequate
ground for the normative basis of practical reason since it makes no claims
other than ones of linguistic relation.376 In the Second Critique, Kant argued
that the categorical imperative must be a synthetic a priori, which involves
some intuition about the moral law.377 Reformulated this way, the Basic
Goods seem to be intuitions about the moral good. They lack the sense of
logical necessity and the universality that are needed for a normative legal
theory in a liberal democracy, where views about the moral good are likely
to differ.
A. The Logic and Realism of Aquinas
The realism of the Schoolmen’s logic is appealing for a natural law theory
because the natural law makes universal claims about the moral good. For
Aquinas, the moral claims of the natural law reflect the mind of God (the
eternal law), and this unites practical reason with theoretical reason.378 The
unity of Being and Good exists in God, whose goodness is synonymous
with the Being that God spoke into Creation.379 But, in the context of
Finnis’ reconstruction of the natural law, the realism of medieval logic is
inconsistent and incompatible.380
This incompatibility is due to Finnis’ acceptance of the legal positivists’
separation of fact and value.381 Since Finnis seeks to derive moral
principles without relying on factual claims, the realism in logic cannot be
accepted. The reason for this is that the realism in Aquinas’ logic asserts
claims about logical relation, the relations between objects, such as the claim
of self-evidence.382 A proposition that is self-evident (per se nota) is so
because the relation between the objects to which it refers are ontologically

376. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON § II THEOREM I (Thomas K.
Abbot trans., 2018) available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5683/5683-h/5683-h.htm
[https://perma.cc/D6FW-JKXS].
377. Id. at § III THEOREM II REMARK II.
378. THOMAS AQUINAS, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 295, 330 (Brian
Davies ed., 2002).
379. Id. at 295–97.
380. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 74.
381. Id. at 66.
382. Id. at 32.
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instantiated.383 That is, there are actual entities that correspond to the selfevident terms.384 Consider Boyle’s explanation of the Basic Goods: “Since
[the Basic Goods] are directions towards the fulfillment of the various
dimensions of human beings, the workings of human nature provide data
which, when understood practically, provide the concepts needed for the
formulation of each of the basic human goods.”385 For example, consider
again the Basic Good of knowledge.386 Understood as a propositio per se nota,
the claim that Finnis is advancing should be understood as meaning that
there is some being (ens) called knowledge, and there is the human being
which has a nature.387 It is self-evident that knowledge is useful for human
beings, given the data on human nature. However, the assertion of
ontological realism also makes this claim violative of the separation of fact
and value. The claim of self-evidence becomes nothing other than a claim
about the facts of the relation between the things that are knowledge and
the things that are the data of human dispositions.
The Thomistic approach is incompatible with the positivists. Hume, for
example, viewed moral sentiments as having no corresponding
perception.388 His separation of fact and value, a consequence of his
empiricism, supported his belief that facts have perceptual origins and moral
claims do not.389 Carnap applied Kantian philosophy to interpret the
distinction between fact and value to be a metaphysical separation between
analytic and synthetic propositions.390 For Carnap, propositions are valid
if, and only if, they are demonstrably valid as either analytic or synthetic
propositions.391 Either they are self-referential and therefore analytic, or
they are synthetic and therefore provable through empirical
investigation.392 Carnap maintains an absolute dichotomy between factual
claims that can be validated and moral claims that cannot be.393 For him,
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id. at 33–34.
Boyle, supra note 62, at 60.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 61–62.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Hilary Putnam, The Empiricist Background, in THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 7, 18 (2002).
Error! Bookmark not defined.391. Id.
392. Id. at 23–24.
393. See id. at 24–26 (discussing Carnap’s insistence on rationally reconstructing language “as a
value judgement or as a description[.]”).
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the realism of the Thomistic propositio per se nota is an assertion of the
analyticity of some propositions that are transparently self-referential.394
But, the Thomistic conception of self-evidence cannot be the foundation
for moral knowledge because it cannot result in moral validity as Carnap
understands it.395 Thus, the realism of the Thomistic understanding of selfevidence is at best irrelevant to the rejection of natural law by the positivists,
and at worst contradictory to it.
B. The Modern Logic
As shown in Part II, self-evidence in modern logic is a claim about
obvious relations in abstract semantic symbols. It has no expectation of an
ontological correspondence among the symbols. For example, returning to
Finnis’ cardinal example, knowledge as a Basic Good would be understood
by modern symbolic language as a purely algebraic formulation. The claim
for the self-evidence of knowledge as a desirable disposition for human
beings is simply understood as the claim A ∈ B, where A is knowledge, and
B is the set of desirable dispositions. The symbolic approach to logic cannot
form the foundation of the moral theory that Finnis seeks because it is not
a claim about moral norms. It is a claim about the facts of analytic relations
between and among abstract terms. This understanding of self-evidence
cannot support the role that Finnis seeks for it in his theory since it does
not make a moral claim at all. For example, if we take the definition of
“knowledge” to be the set of information about some object or process that
is understood by a person, and the definition of “dispensation” as the many
types of readiness of the human mind and body, then the claim that all
knowledge is the object of a human dispensation can be formally stated. As
an example, a formation statement of the self-evident claim that knowledge
of geometry is a dispensation of human being would be set out in predicate
calculus like this:
Premise 1: “If anything is knowledge, then there exists a human
dispensation for it.”
Premise 2: “Geometry is a type of knowledge.”
Conclusion: “Geometry corresponds to a human dispensation for
it.”

394. Id.
395. Id.
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Formal premises: For all x, K(x)→D(x). K(g).
Intermediate step: universal instantiation: K(g)→D(g).
Formal conclusion: modus ponens ∴ D(g).
This is not the conception of self-evidence that Finnis is seeking because it
is abstract and formal. Therefore, it is insubstantial to the actual claims of
practical reason, which are always substantial and particular. The modern
symbolic logic reduces Finnis’ claim for self-evident Basic Goods to factual
claims about the logical relations of sets of abstract terms.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay argues that Finnis looks for epistemological justification for
the normative claims of natural law in his assertion of self-evident basic
principles of practical reason. It considers Finnis’ claims through a rigorous
close examination of the concept of self-evidence. Finnis makes use of two
concepts of self-evidence. One is taken from Aquinas’ logic in which selfevidence is called a propositio per se nota.396 The other concept is that of
modern symbolic logic.397 The medieval concept anticipates ontological
realism, while the modern concept of self-evidence refers to correlations
among symbols represented in language.398 The essay argues that Finnis
equivocates about which concept he is applying to his construction of selfevident basic principles of practical reason. But neither concept serves the
purposes he seeks for the grounds of natural law. Self-evidence, as it is
understood by both medieval and modern logicians, is inapplicable as the
epistemological ground for Finnis’ normative claims for the natural law.399
This analysis suggests that the future of natural law theories may depend on
rejecting the dichotomous separation of fact and value.
Whether there exists the kind of conception of self-evidence that can do
the work that Finnis seeks for validating the Basic Goods remains an open
question. But it seems unlikely. In an essay examining the assertion of selfevidence in the Declaration of Independence, Stewart Shapiro considers
many concepts of self-evidence that have arisen in modern philosophy of
mathematics by the most influential logicians—Hilbert, Gödel, Russell,
Frege, and Zermelo.400 He concludes:
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

FINNIS, supra note 1, at 32.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 67.
Shapiro, supra note 337, at 177–204.
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The notion of self-evidence occurs prominently—early and often—in the
education of just about every American. The “Declaration of Independence
of the Thirteen Colonies” that would later constitute the United States of
America reads, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. Let
us leave aside the part of the Creator. I have no doubt that all people should
indeed be treated as equal in any civilized community, and that the human
rights listed are inviolable. But it is not so clear just what the author of this
venerable document meant by “self-evident”. The propositions were not, and
are not, Zermelo self-evident, applied unreflectively, although it would be a
much better world if they were. Perhaps the truths are Fregean self-evident.
Perhaps a sufficient grasp of the propositions, and in particular a clear and
distinct knowledge of the concept expressed by the word “men” (or “people”,
or “human”) is sufficient for one to know, without doing any reasoning, that
the propositions are true. Would that it were so, but people who flout human
rights could hardly be accused of not understanding the concept “men” (or
“people”, or “human”). Like the axiom of choice, the truths in question are
indeed obvious now, at least to many of us, but they were hardly obvious then.
If they were obvious, the framers would not even have to state them, much
less call them self-evident.401

This observation about the Declaration of Independence may well be true
of Finnis’ self-evident Basic Goods. These truths assert privilege to some
and deny privilege to others. Their terms are open to disagreement.
Nevertheless, like the self-evident truths of the Declaration, they have
served as guidelines or planning goals for law, which may frequently fail to
meet the challenge of ensuring equal and maximal access to the goods of
life, liberty, and happiness. They may be common goals for creating a legal
system if they are not taken to be self-evident truths like those of
propositional logic.
This leaves open the hermeneutical approach, where claims of universal
applicability are subordinated to openness of inquiry, freedom to interpret,
and freedom to live out life plans that may seem unintelligible to others, all
in the name of serving the mysterious sense of intellectual obligation that
has animated the search for truth throughout human existence. Rather than
apodictic truths, there are trends towards seeking the sort of experiential
truths that Augustine viewed as certain because of the quality of givenness
401. Id. at 204–05.
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of their lived experience.402 The experience of living true to a life plan may
be the best, or only, way of finding a sense of apodictic moral truth. But
this conclusion would suggest that the universalism and comprehensiveness
that Finnis seeks in natural law might ever prove elusive. Nonetheless, as
Neil Gorsuch wrote: “Others have, and will for years to come, write and
speak about, learn from and debate John Finnis’ contributions to ethics,
philosophy, even Shakespearean scholarship and theology.”403 It is an
important contribution with lasting significance.

402. An example of this can be found in Dominique Janicaud’s The Theological Turn of French
Phenomenology, in PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE “THEOLOGICAL TURN”: THE FRENCH DEBATE 3, 28–
34 (Bernard G. Prusak trans., 2000), which discusses the phenomenology of the unapparent and the
question of givenness.
403. Neil M. Gorsuch, Intention and the Allocation of Risk, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW supra
note 2, at 413, 413.
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